Government Liability Update

California Supreme Court: City Does Not Violate Constitution by Seeking Injunction to Enforce Ordinance Later Found Unconstitutional

In Manta Management Corporation v. City of San Bernardino, filed April 24, 2008, a unanimous California Supreme Court held that municipalities generally cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for seeking either an injunction to enforce an ordinance, or a writ of supersedeas from a court of appeal seeking to preserve an injunction during an appeal -- even if the ordinance itself is later determined to be unconstitutional. The ordinance at issue in this case was a zoning ordinance regulating adult businesses. Analogizing the case to other decisions in which defendants were sued for seeking relief from courts (such as criminal prosecutions), the court held that a judge's decision that good cause exists for the injunction or stay is a superseding cause of the harm; and thus breaks the chain of causation between the municipality's act and the plaintiff's injury. The court emphasized that it was not basing its decision on immunity principles. As with similar cases, the court ruled, the municipality can be held liable if it brought about the judge's decision by pressuring the judge to rule its way; or by making material misrepresentations to the judge. The court held that the misrepresentations do not have to be intentional to trigger the exception.

Social Worker Immune from Liability for Conducting Deficient Investigation Before Returning Child to Parent

in Ortega v. Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services , filed today, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that a social worker was immune from liability for returning an 11-year-old girl to her father, who had a drug problem.  Four days after custody was returned, the father stabbed the child.  The court concluded that even though, in its opinion, the social worker's investigation was "lousy," the worker was immune under Government Code section 820.2 for her discretionary decision to return the child.  The worker's only mandatory duties were to investigate before returning the child -- and the worker did so.

Public Official Can Be Held Liable for Defamatory Speech

In Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego, a divided 3-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled that a county supervisor who made hostile public comments about a mobilehome park owner could be held liable if the comments amounted to false statements of fact.  The appellate court reversed a district court decision granting an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the lawsuit.   The majority ruled that a jury could find some of the supervisor's statements to be false assertions of fact, rather than hyperbole or opinions.

The dissenting judge argued that the mobilehome park owner had failed to establish that any of the supervisor's statements were false; and that an anti-SLAPP motion was therefore appropriate.

California Supreme Court: Creation of a Dangerous Condition of Public Property in Itself Insufficient to Create Liability

In Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin, filed February 21, 2008, the California Supreme Court rejected an argument that a public entity may be held liable under Government Code section 835 (dangerous condition of public property) merely because its property was in a dangerous condition; or even merely because the entity created the condition.  Instead, the plaintiff must prove either that a negligent or wrongful act of a public employee created the condition; or that the entity had notice of the condition long enough before the accident to take precautions.

The court explained that the creation of a dangerous condition may be evidence that the act of creation was negligent ; but it is not enough to compel a conclusion that the act was negligent.  Instead, the plaintiff must prove either common-law negligence on the part of the employee who created the condition; or notice.

The court also discussed the interaction of this standard with Government Code section 835.4, which provides that public entities cannot be held liable under section 835 if the acts or omissions that created the condition were reasonable.  The court explained that proof of negligent creation does not necessarily negate a finding of reasonableness.  Under section 835.4, the entity may absolve itself from liability for creating or failing to remedy a dangerous condition by showing it would have been too costly and impractical to have done anything else.

Firefighting Immunities Eliminate Public Entity Duties to Fire Victims

People v. Superior Court (United Water Conservation District), published on February 4, 2008, arises out of a suit by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection against the real party District, for reimbursement of fire-fighting costs.  The District admitted it started a 2003 forest fire that cost over $3.871 million to combat.  The District alleged that the plaintiff Department was negligent in fighting the fire.  The District asserted affirmative defenses of comparative fault and failure to mitigate damages.  The trial  court allowed the District to pursue these defenses. 

The Court of Appeal issued a writ directing the trial court to grant judgment on the pleadings against the defenses.  It ruled that the fire-fighting immunities under Government Code sections 850, 850.2 and 850.4 were complete immunities that eliminated any duty that the Department owes to persons or property damaged by fire.  The immunities therefore bar any allocation of fault to the Department for the fire's damage.

By comparison, Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, discussed below in an earlier post, held that another Government Code immunity (Goverment Code section 821.6) did not eliminate immune public employees' duties; and therefore did not bar apportionment of fault to those employees under Proposition 51.

Classes Seeking County Tax Refunds Need Only Present Single Claim for Damages

Reviewing over 30 years of case law on claims procedures as applied to class actions and tax refund actions, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Oronoz) concluded that a class action seeking a refund on a county tax requires only a single prelitigation claim for damages on behalf of the entire class.  Government Code section 910's requirements that the claim include specified information concerning the claimant are applied as if the class was the claimant.

Officers Not Liable For High-Speed Chases Absent Intent to Harm

Bingue v. Prunchak, a 9th Circuit case published on January 15, 2008, examined the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court's standard of liability under 42 USC section 1983 for police officers engaged in emergency high-speed chases -- that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless they have an intent to harm the plaintiff -- applies when the officer has time to consider whether to initiate or join the chase.  The Court decided that it did -- because all high-speed chases are inherently "emergencies."

The sheer velocity of a high-speed chase necessarily
converts each situation into a genuine “emergency.” Trying to
sort high-speed chases into the neat categories of “emergency”
and “non-emergency” situations is much like trying to
bake a cake and having to distinguish between salt and sugar
by sight alone: it is a nearly impossible task that has a high
likelihood of producing an unpleasant result.

The 9th Circuit therefore reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, on qualified immunity grounds, to an officer who side-swiped an innocent person's car while pursuing a suspect.  It held that police officers engaged in high-speed chases are categorically entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating victims' constitutional rights, unless the officers intend to harm the victims.

Prop 51 and Prosecutorial Immunity

Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, in which we represent the defendants, sets forth important rulings concerning the accrual of a criminal defendant's cause of action for legal malpractice, and Prop 51 apportionment of fault to a tortfeasor who is immune from liability under Government Code section 821.6.

Government Wedding Crashers Immune

In Richardson-Tunnell v. SIPE, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, addressed whether a workers compensation JPA and a school district employer  could be held liable under the Californiapaparazzi statute for workers comp investigators who  posed as wedding guests so that they could surreptitiously video a claimant at her wedding -- and who later videotaped the claimant on her honeymoon -- could be held liable under California's paparazzi statute.  The court held that they could not.  Government Code section 821.6 -- which immunizes administrative and legal prosecutions -- immunized the investigative conduct.

The court also held that section 821.6's immunity is jurisdictional.  The defendants therefore did not waive the defense by failing to plead it in their answer.  Instead, it could be asserted for the first time on a motion for judgment on the pleadings; or even on appeal.

Contract Breaches Need Claims Too

A new California Supreme Court Case, City of Stockton v. Superior Court (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC) , filed December 3, 2007 settles several important issues concerning the Government Code's claim requirements for suing public entities:

• Resolving a longtime split in authority, the Court ruled that the claim-presentation requirements apply to breach of contract claims that seek damages.  They are not limited to tort claims.
• Because the Government Code sections controlling claims and liability of public entities apply to more than just claims, the Court proclaimed it would no longer describe Government Code section 810 et seq as the "Tort Claims Act."  Instead, it will refer to the statutes as the "Government Claims Act."
• Government Code section 814, which states that nothing in "this party" applies to breach of contract, only deals with the immunity portions of the Government Claims Act.  The claim requirements have nothing to do with Governmental immunity.
• A plaintiff cannot argue that the entity is estopped from enforcing the claim-presentation requirements unless the plaintiff can identify a specific act or statement by the entity that prevented or deterred it from filing a timely claim.
• An entity does not waive the claim-presentation requirements by waiting until the claim-presentation period has expired before asserting the requirements.  The defendant here did not waive the requirements by filing multiple demurrers that did not assert the plaintiff''s failure to present a claim.
• Correspondence does not constitute a "claim as presented" -- requiring the entity to respond with a Notice of Insufficiency or else waive the claim requirement -- unless it "specifically alert[s] defendants to weigh the alternatives of litigation or compromise."