MICRA 3-year Outer Limit Applies to Public Entity Defendants

The Second District Court of Appeal has ruled that the three-years-from-injury outer statute of limitations in CCP 340.5 (part of MICRA) applies to suits against public entity defendants.  Roberts v. County of Los Angeles, published today.

Safe Water Drinking Act's Obligation for Counties to Oversee Drinking Water Systems Does Not Impose Mandatory Duty to Notify Users of Dangers

In Guzman v. County of Monterey, published today, the California Supreme Court rejected an argument that the Safe Water Drinking Act requires counties that oversee privately-owned water systems to report unsafe conditions in those water systems to the users.  The Act places that responsibility on the system owners.  The Court therefore held that the defendant county could not be held liable under Government Code section 815.6 to users exposed to water with unsafe flouride levels.

Supreme Court Permits Reimbursement for Private School Special Education if School Fails to Provide It

In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., published today, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a school district fails to provide a special education student any special education services, and the parent therefore enrolls the child in private special education, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act permits a hearing officer or court to order the school district to reimburse the parent for private education.  This decision expands upon previous decisions allowing reimbursement for private education where a school district first provides special education services that are inadequate. 

Government Code 815.6 Immunity Applies to Investigation That Allegedly Violates Peace Officers' Bill of Rights

In Paterson v. City of Los Angeles, published today, the plaintiffs, a married couple of LAPD officers, alleged that the city and their supervisor violated the Peace Officers' Bill of Rights statutes in investigating one of the officers' use of sick leave.  The supervisor allegedly sent a sergeant to the officers' house to see if the officer on sick leave was home.  The sergeant spoke with the couples' son and called the officer on his cell phone.  The officers alleged this was an investigation into suspected wrongdoing that failed to comply with the Bill of Rights' due process protections.  They also sued for infliction of emotional distress.

The appellate court reversed the summary judgment granted the defendants on the Bill of Rights cause of action.  But it affirmed summary judgment as to the emotional distress claim.  It ruled that Government Code section 815.6 -- which generally immunizes public employees (and vicariously their employers) from liability for investigations -- immunized the defendants from tort liability for the alledged sick leave investigation.

Public Entity Asserting Lack of Judicial Exhaustion Must Prove Elements

In Y.K.A. v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Pomona, published on May 27, 2009, the Sixth DCA reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant agency.  The Agency had obtained summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had sued for violation of due process without exhausting judicial remedies -- i.e., petitioning for a writ of administrative mandamus.  The appellate court ruled that the agency had the obligation of establishing the elements of the judicial exhaustion defense:  That the plaintiff had available an administrative remedy that afforded a quasi-judicial hearing; and that the petitioner failed to pursue it through an administrative mandamus petition.

California Supreme Court: Finding That Police Shooting Is "Reasonable" in Federal Civil Rights Action Bars Negligent Shooting Cause of Action

In Hernandez v. City of Pomona, decided today, the California Supreme Court ruled that a federal court and jury's finding in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case that a police shooting of a suspect after a pursuit was reasonable collaterally estops the plaintiffs in that case from suing the police for negligently deciding to shoot the suspect.  The court further held that the finding did not necessarily bar a theory that the officers negligently created the situation that led to the shooting.  Under the facts of the case, however, the court concluded such a cause of action would not be viable.

School Districts May Owe Duty to Children Getting Off School Bus

In Eric M. v. Cajon Valley Union Sch. Dist., published May 27, 2009, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, held that a school district that adopted a transportation plan for students might owe a duty of care under Education Code 44808 to a six-year-old who exited a school bus -- because he thought he saw his father's car at the school yard to pick him up -- and was hit by a car.  Whether a duty existed, and whether it was breached, depended on disputed facts.  The court therefore reversed summary adjudication for the school district.

State Cannot Bar Suits under Federal Civil Rights Statute

In Haywood v. Drown, published on May 26, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York State statute that divested state courts of jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suits brought by prisoners against state correctional officers.  The statute limited prisoners who sued in state court to a court of limited jurisdiction that could not award attorney fees or punitive damages.  The Supreme Court held that the Supremecy Clause requires state courts to entertain section 1983 suits unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. 

California Supreme Court Upholds Proposition 8

In its May 26, 2009 decision in Strauss v. Horton, the California Supreme Court ruled that California voters had the power to amend the state constitution to provide that marriage is only between a man and a woman.  Opponents of Proposition 8 had argued that the measure was not just an amendment to the constitution (which can be accomplished by initiative), but a revision of the constitution (which cannot).  The Supreme Court rejected this argument.  It did, however, uphold the same-sex marriages carried out in California under Proposition 8.

Patronage Doctrine Applies to Political Loyalty but Not Personal Loyalty

The patronage doctrine provides that a fired public employee cannot sue the employer for First Amendment retaliation arising out of the termination if the employee was terminated based on political loyalty to an opposition.  In Nichols v. Dancer, published today, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend the doctrine to protect an employer who terminates an employee for lack of personal loyalty to the employer.