Officers Not Liable For High-Speed Chases Absent Intent to Harm

Bingue v. Prunchak, a 9th Circuit case published on January 15, 2008, examined the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court's standard of liability under 42 USC section 1983 for police officers engaged in emergency high-speed chases -- that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless they have an intent to harm the plaintiff -- applies when the officer has time to consider whether to initiate or join the chase.  The Court decided that it did -- because all high-speed chases are inherently "emergencies."

The sheer velocity of a high-speed chase necessarily
converts each situation into a genuine “emergency.” Trying to
sort high-speed chases into the neat categories of “emergency”
and “non-emergency” situations is much like trying to
bake a cake and having to distinguish between salt and sugar
by sight alone: it is a nearly impossible task that has a high
likelihood of producing an unpleasant result.

The 9th Circuit therefore reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, on qualified immunity grounds, to an officer who side-swiped an innocent person's car while pursuing a suspect.  It held that police officers engaged in high-speed chases are categorically entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating victims' constitutional rights, unless the officers intend to harm the victims.