Government Liability Update

California Supreme Court: City Does Not Violate Constitution by Seeking Injunction to Enforce Ordinance Later Found Unconstitutional

In Manta Management Corporation v. City of San Bernardino, filed April 24, 2008, a unanimous California Supreme Court held that municipalities generally cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for seeking either an injunction to enforce an ordinance, or a writ of supersedeas from a court of appeal seeking to preserve an injunction during an appeal -- even if the ordinance itself is later determined to be unconstitutional. The ordinance at issue in this case was a zoning ordinance regulating adult businesses. Analogizing the case to other decisions in which defendants were sued for seeking relief from courts (such as criminal prosecutions), the court held that a judge's decision that good cause exists for the injunction or stay is a superseding cause of the harm; and thus breaks the chain of causation between the municipality's act and the plaintiff's injury. The court emphasized that it was not basing its decision on immunity principles. As with similar cases, the court ruled, the municipality can be held liable if it brought about the judge's decision by pressuring the judge to rule its way; or by making material misrepresentations to the judge. The court held that the misrepresentations do not have to be intentional to trigger the exception.

Officers Not Liable For High-Speed Chases Absent Intent to Harm

Bingue v. Prunchak, a 9th Circuit case published on January 15, 2008, examined the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court's standard of liability under 42 USC section 1983 for police officers engaged in emergency high-speed chases -- that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless they have an intent to harm the plaintiff -- applies when the officer has time to consider whether to initiate or join the chase.  The Court decided that it did -- because all high-speed chases are inherently "emergencies."

The sheer velocity of a high-speed chase necessarily
converts each situation into a genuine “emergency.” Trying to
sort high-speed chases into the neat categories of “emergency”
and “non-emergency” situations is much like trying to
bake a cake and having to distinguish between salt and sugar
by sight alone: it is a nearly impossible task that has a high
likelihood of producing an unpleasant result.

The 9th Circuit therefore reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, on qualified immunity grounds, to an officer who side-swiped an innocent person's car while pursuing a suspect.  It held that police officers engaged in high-speed chases are categorically entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating victims' constitutional rights, unless the officers intend to harm the victims.