Government Liability Update

Ninth Circuit Rejects California Lower Appellate Courts' Decisions Concerning Discretionary Immunity for Foster Child Placement; Iqbal Standards Apply to Pleading Monell Liability

In A.E. v. County of Tulare, published January 27, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's decision dismissing federal and state causes of action against a county defendant arising out of placement of a foster child in a home where another foster child allegedly attacked him.

The county contended that the district court properly dismissed the state law claims against it because California case law dictated public employees were entitled to discretionary immunity under Government Code section 820.2 for decisions concerning foster child placement.  The Ninth Circuit declined to follow this case law.  It determined that the decisions on the matter from lower appellate courts conflicted with California Supreme Court case law limiting discretionary immunity to policy decisions.  The court declared itself bound by the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the law.  Since the district court allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint to state a negligence cause of action against the employees, it should have allowed the plaintiff to amend to state a claim against the county for vicarious liability under Government Code section 815.2.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's allegations that the county was liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violating the foster child's rights through a custom, policy, or practice.  The allegations stated only the bare elements of municipal liability.  Although the Ninth Circuit's case law had previously approved that sort of pleading as sufficient, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) requires a plaintiff to plead plausible facts in support of section 1983 causes of action.  That standard applies to Monell liability of municipalities.  But the district court erred in failing to allow the plaintiff to amend these allegations.

Challenge to Denial of Zone Change Must Be Filed within 90 Days of Decision

In General Development Co. v. City of Santa Maria, published January 25, 2012, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Six, interpreted Government Code section 65009 (c)(1)(B) -- which requires any action challenging a legislative body's decision on adopting or amending a zoning ordinance to be filed within 90 days of the decision -- to apply to a city council's denial of an application for a zone change.  The court affirmed the trial court's decision sustaining the respondent city's demurrer to a petition for writ of administrative mandamus on the ground that it was untimely.

Suspect's Lawful Activities May Give Police Officers Cause to Fear for Own Safety and to Enter Home without Warrant

In Ryburn v. Huff, published January 23, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a divided Ninth Circuit decision that the defendant police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for entering the plaintiffs' home without a warrant.  The defendant officers visited the home of a high school student, investigating rumors that the student had written a letter threatening to shoot up the school.  The student had been absent from school for two days, and was frequently bullied.  When the officers visited, they received no response to their knocks on the door or their calls to the home telephone.  The officers called the student's mother's cell phone and talked to the mother.  She stated she was inside the house with the student.  When the officers stated they were at the house, she hung up on them.  The mother and student went outside and spoke with the officers.  The mother declined the officers' request to enter the home to discuss the matter.  When the officers asked if there were guns in the house, the mother turned and ran inside the house.  The officers followed her.  They eventually determined the rumors were false.  The family sued the officers under 42 USC section 1983 for violating their Fourth Amendment rights.  The district court entered judgment in favor of the officers, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the officers could reasonably believe they were in danger. 

The Supreme Court, per curiam, upheld the district court's decision.  The Ninth Circuit majority, in reversing the district court, erred in viewing each of the plaintiffs' acts in isolation; and by concluding that because each was lawful, none supported a reasonable conclusion that the officers were in danger.  Viewed together, the information from the school and the mother's evasive behavior supported a reasonable fear of danger.  The entry into the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Rulings in State Court FEHA Action and City Administrative Proceeding Preclude Plaintiff's Federal Suit for Retaliatory Termination

In White v. City of Pasadena, published January 17, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a former police officer's suit against her former employer for termination that was allegedly in retaliation for her disability-discrimination litigation against the employer.  The plaintiff initially filed a FEHA suit alleging that her employer discriminated against her based on perceived disability.  The jury found against her disability-discrimination claim, and that decision was affirmed on appeal.  Later, the plaintiff was terminated for allegedly lying about a purported suicide attempt.  She engaged in mandatory administrative arbitration concerning the termination.  The arbitrator rendered an opinion that the termination was improper, but the city manager -- the final decision maker -- rejected this opinion and upheld the termination.  The plaintiff filed an administrative mandamus writ petition in state court challenging that decision.  The court upheld it.  The plaintiff also filed a lawsuit alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for her discrimination lawsuit, in violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  She sought damages from the employer under 42 USC section 1983 and under various state law causes of action.  The employer removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed.

The court held that state court decisions have the same claim-preclusive and issue-preclusive effect on federal litigation as they would have on state court litigation.  The decision on the state court FEHA claim precluded her allegations in the federal lawsuit that the employer discriminated against her based on her perceived disability.  And the administrative decision on her termination, which met the California standards for claim preclusion, barred her claim that the employer had an insufficient or pretextual reason for her termination.