Government Liability Update

Negligent False Imprisonment Does Not Support Liability under the Bane Act

In Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, published February 23, 2012, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Four, ruled that negligent conduct -- including negligent false imprisonment -- does not give rise to liability under the Bane Act, Civil Code section 52.1. 

The Bane Act creates a cause of action for interference with state law, federal law, or state or federal constitutional rights, if the interference was done by threats, intimidation, or coercion.  The plaintiff was properly jailed due to two outstanding warrants.  But due to negligence, he was kept in jail for 16 days after the date he should have been released.  During his incarceration, officials disregarded his questions about why he was still in jail, or were rude to him.  A jury found both that he was falsely imprisoned and that the jailor was liable under the Bane Act.

The appellate court reversed the latter finding.  Interpreting the Bane Act's language and history, it concluded that negligent conduct does not support a cause of action under the Bane Act.  Only deliberate or spiteful conduct will support Bane Act liability.  Although imprisonment is inherently coercive, a negligent false imprisonment is not enough.  The court therefore reversed the award of attorney fees made under the Bane Act count.  But because the evidence indicated that the damages under the false imprisonment and Bane Act counts were the same, the court allowed the damages award to stand.

Supreme Court: Police Officers Generally Entitled to Qualified Immunity if Search Warrant Application Approved by Superior, D.A., and Neutral Magistrate

In Messerschmidt v. Millender, published February 22, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed an en banc 9th Circuit decision that a police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for carrying out a search under a warrant.  The warrant was issued after the suspect's victim told police that the suspect was trying to kill her with a particular weapon, that he threatened her because she called the police on him, and that he was in a street gang.  The warrant application called for search and seizure of all firearms and firearm-related items in the suspect's residence, along with all gang-related materials.  The application was approved by the officer's superior and the district attorney.  A magistrate issued the warrant.  The officer seized a firearm from the persons at the residence, although the suspect was not there.  The persons at the residence then sued the officer for violation of the 4th Amendment.  The en banc 9th Circuit held that a warrant that called for seizure of all firearms (not just the one used in the crime) and gang materials was so obviously overbroad that no reasonable officer could have believed it valid; and ruled that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.

The Supreme Court majority agreed that an officer cannot rely on a warrant that is so deficient that no reasonable officer could rely on it, and will not be entitled to qualified immunity for relying on such a warrant.  But that is a rare exception to the rule that an officer who relies on a warrant approved by a neutral magistrate will generally be entitled to qualified immunity.  In particular, since this warrant contained only correct facts, did not omit material facts, and was approved by a superior, a prosecutor, and a neutral magistrate, a reasonable officer could have believed that the warrant was proper.  The majority did not rule on whether the warrant was in fact proper.  One concurring justice concluded the warrant was proper; another justice concluded that an officer could reasonably believe the warrant was proper as to the fireams but not as to the gang materials; and two justices dissented from the ruling.

County Sheriff Could Not Demote Lieutenant Sheriff for Opposing Him in Election; But Sheriff Entitled to Qualified Immunity

In Hunt v. County of Orange, published February 13, 2012, a divided 9th Circuit panel reversed a district court ruling that a county sheriff was within his right to demote a lieutenant sheriff who ran against the sheriff in an election, and criticized the sheriff during the campaign.  The First Amendment bars an elected official from firing or otherwise retaliating against employees for their political activities.  There is a narrow exception for employees in "policymaking" positions.  The lieutenant sheriff plaintiff was one of sixty lieutenants, and did not deal directly with the sheriff; but he was also the chief of police services for a city in the county.  The jury, in response to special interrogatories, concluded that the factors that render an employee a policymaker did not apply to the plaintiff.  The district court nevertheless concluded that the factors applied to the plaintiff, and that the sheriff therefore had the right to demote the plaintiff.  It alternatively ruled that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity.

The 9th Circuit panel majority reversed the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff was a policymaker.  The key question in determining policymaker status is not whether the factors of a mechanical test apply, but rather whether political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for the employee's performance of his or her duties.  The sheriff failed to prove that the lieutenant's loyalty to the sheriff was necessary to carrying out his duties.  The district court also concluded that the jury's findings established that the plaintiff was not a policyholder.  But because a reasonable elected official could have mistakenly concluded that the plaintiff was a policyholder, the majority affirmed the district court's conclusion that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity.

The dissenting judge opined that the plaintiff was a policyholder.

Where Decedent's Accomplice's Conviction Litigated Issue of Whether Officer Acted with Excessive Force, Decedent's Family Barred from Suing Officer for Use of Excessive Force

The Heck v. Humphrey preclusion doctrine bars a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime from bringing a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 that, if successful, would invalidate the basis for the plaintiff's conviction.  In Beets v. County of Los Angeles, published February 10, 2012, the 9th Circuit applied the Heck v. Humphrey preclusion doctrine to a situation where the decedent's accomplice -- not the plaintiff or decedent -- was convicted.

The decedent was killed by police officers while he and the accomplice were fleeing and resisting arrest.  When the accomplice was prosecuted, the jury was asked to find that the officer who killed the decedent was acting in the scope of his duties and was not using excessive force.  Under these circumstances, the 9th Circuit ruled, the decedent's heirs were barred from suing the police officer for use of excessive force.