Government Liability Update

"Similarly-Situated" Evidence Not Necessary to Raise Issue of Fact on Discriminatory Disparate Effect of Housing Ordinance if Plaintiffs Present Evidence of Discriminatory Intent

In Pacific Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, published September 20, 2013, a Ninth Circuit panel that included both conservative judge Alex Kozinski and liberal judge Stephen Reinhardt reversed defense summary judgment in two lawsuits that group homes for recovering alcoholics and drug users brought against the defendant city under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disability Act, California's FEHA, and the Equal Protection Clause challenging a housing ordinance that, they alleged, had the practical effect of banning such homes.  The district court had granted summary judgment because of lack of evidence that similarly-situated persons or entities were treated differently than the plaintiffs under the ordinance.  The court disregarded a large amount of evidence that the city had intended to ban the group homes and put them out of business.  The Ninth Circuit held that approach was erroneous.  Different treatment of similarly-situated entities is only one way of raising a triable issue of fact in a disparate-impact discrimination case.  If, as here, there is evidence of an intent to discriminate against a protected class (here, alcoholics and drug addicts), no "similarly-situated" evidence is necessary.  The panel also found triable issues of fact on whether the ordinance caused the damages of which the plaintiffs complained.

Pursuit Immunity Applies to Officer Opening Car Door During Traffic Stop

In Moreno v. Rowell San-Luis Quemuel, published September 17, 2013, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 2, affirmed summary judgment in favor of a deputy sheriff in a lawsuit brought by a motorcyclist who collided with the deputy's open car door.  The deputy had pulled over a motorist for driving the wrong way on a one-way street.  As part of the traffic stop, the deputy had opened his driver side door so that he could exit his patrol car. The appellate court held that Vehicle Code section 17004, which immunizes peace officers for injury resulting from the operation of an emergency vehicle in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, applied.  When a peace officer opens his or her car door as a precursor to exiting and making contact with a motorist during a traffic stop, the officer is in "immediate pursuit" of a suspect for purposes of the immunity.  The peace officer therefore cannot be held liable for negligence.  Vehicle Code section 17001, however, still provides a remedy against the negligent officer's employing public entity.

Officers Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Handcuffing Unresponsive 11-Year-Old and Taking Him from School to Relative

 

Update:  An en banc opinion was published on October 15, 2014, affirming the district court in part and reversing it in part.  A summary of the en banc opinion is posted elsewhere on this blog.

In C.B. v. City of Sonora, published September 12, 2013, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed for retrial a jury verdict against a city and its police officers, and ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity against 4th Amendment claims, in a lawsuit arising from an incident in which the officers handcuffed an 11-year-old student on school grounds, took him in a police car, and delivered him to a relative.  The student suffered from ADHD and hyperactivity; had not taken his medication that day; was not responding to teachers or the officers; and on previous occasions had expressed the desire to run into traffic.  The only information the officers had was that the child was a "runner" and had not taken his medications.  The verdict was reversed because the district court's colloquy with the jury over an inconsistent jury verdict for defendants was confusing, and resulted in the jury redeliberating and rendering a decision for the plaintiff.  The officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they cited Welfare & Institutions Code sections 601 and 625 (which permit officers to take minors into temporary custody without a warrant when the minors are "beyond the control" of "custodians"), and there was and is no law  clearly establishing that taking a non-responsive minor off-campus in handcuffs and delivering him to a relative was unlawful.  A dissenting judge opined that the officers' actions violated clearly established 4th Amendment rights govenring seizures of students.