Government Liability Update

Collateral Estoppel Is Insufficient Basis for Allowing Unconstitutional Exaction on Construction

In Bowman v. California Coastal Commission, opinion on rehearing published October 23, 2014, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6, reversed a judgment denying a property owner's petition for writ of mandate challenging a requirement that a property owner dedicate a coastal easement as a condition of repairing its property. When the owner's predecessor in interest purchased an unoccupied property in San Luis Obispo.  He applied to the county for a coastal development permit to allow him to fix the property up for habitation.  After the predecessor passed away and a successor trust took over the property, the CDP was granted, conditioned upon dedicating a lateral easement along the shorefront portion of the property.  The rationale was that occupation of the property would increase the intensity of the use.  The period for the owner to challenge the condition passed without the owner appealing the condition.   The county code actually exempted the work to be done from the need for a CDP.  No work was done under that CDP. Nine months later, the owner applied for another CDP to conduct further remodeling and repair, and for removal of the easement condition.  The county approved the CDP.  Public interest groups appealed the easement condition's removal to the California Coastal Commission.  The Commission ruled that the easement condition was permanent and binding.  The trial court declined to issue a writ of mandate reversing the ruling.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion.  The easement condition was an unconstitutional exaction and a taking, because there was no rough proportionality between the condition and work on a private residence a mile from the coast.  While normally a party's failure to timely seek a writ of mandamus will collaterally estop the party from later challenging a quasi-judicial administrative decision, there is an equitable component to collateral estoppel.  Here, under the circumstances, it would be inequitable to apply the doctrine to uphold an easement requirement that never should have been imposed.

Officers Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Removing Non-Responsive Sixth Grader from School Campus, But Not For Keeping Him in Handcuffs During Transport

In C.B. v. City of Sonora, en banc opinion published October 15, 2014, the en banc 9th Circuit -- in a highly split opinion -- affirmed a jury's verdict and district court decisionthat the police officer defendants were liable for violating the minor plaintiff's 4th Amendment right to be free from excessive force, and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity against that claim, but reversed the district court's decision that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for removing the child from campus.  The child, a sixth grader who had ADHD, had forgotten to take his medications, and was sitting in the playground, not obeying a school coach's instructions to come inside.  The coach summoned police. The dispatcher stated the student was "out of control." When the officer defendants arrived, the coach whispered to them "runner" and "[n]o medicine."  The student did not respond to the officers' questions.  The officers handcuffed the student, put him in a police car, and transported him to his uncle's place of business, keeping him in handcuffs.

The majority of judges concluded that under the circumstances -- including the information that the student was out of control, was a "runner," and had not had "medicine", the law was not clearly established that removing the student from the campus was unconstitutional.  The officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the student's 4th amendment rights by removing him without further investigation, particularly in light of a school official's belief that the police needed to remove the student.  A different majority determined, however, that the circumstances did not justify keeping the student in handcuffs for thirty minutes in a locked police car while transporting him, without any information that the student needed to be restrained or exploring alternatives such as having his uncle pick him up closer to school.