Government Liability Update

Although Statutory Immunity Does Not Apply to False Imprisonment Claim against Assistant DA, Common-Law Immunity Applies

In Bocanegra v. Jakubowski, published October 27, 2015, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2 affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against an assistant district attorney for the plaintiff's imprisonment and the injuries he allegedly received during that imprisonment.  Police officers arrested the plaintiff based on a bench warrant for a person with a similar name.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant assistant DA had information that would show that the plaintiff was wrongfully imprisoned, but did not investigate whether he was the wrong person or turn over the exculpatory information to the plaintiff's defense attorney.  When the plaintiff appeared before a judge, he was freed.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the assistant DA was statutorily immune from all causes of action except false imprisonment.  Government Code section 821.6's prosecutorial immunity applied to those causes of action.  The court majority disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that section 821.6 applied to the false imprisonment cause of action.  It held that section 821.6 does not apply to a false imprisonment claim that a lawfully arrested prisoner was imprisoned past the time he should have been freed due to negligence of a prosecutor.  The majority ruled, however, that the statutory immunity did not preempt the common law immunity that applies to judicial officers and those involved in the judicial process.  By prosecuting the action, the assistant DA was acting as a judicial officer.  He was thus entitled to common-law immunity.  A concurring justice opined that section 821.6 should have immunized the DA from liability under all of the causes of action.

League of Cities Is Entitled to In Camera Review to Determine Whether E-mails Between City Attorney and League Are Privileged from Production under California Public Records Act

In League of California Cities v. Superior Court (San Diegans for Open Government), published October 28, 2015, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order directing production of e-mails between the San Diego City Attorney and the Legal Advocacy Committee of the League of California Cities in response to the real party's California Public Records Act request; and directing the court to examine the e-mails in camera to determine whether they are protected by attorney-client or work product privileges.

The court interpreted the statute permitting review of trial court decisions under the CPRA via writ petition as allowing the League to petition for writ review, even though it was not a party to the trial court proceedings.  Although the statute permits "parties" to petition for writ review, the court interpreted the statute's definition of "party" to include those with a beneficial interest in writ review.  The court further concluded that the records were public records under the CPRA, subject to production unless an exception applied.  The court found substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the e-mails were not protected by attorney-client privilege or work product.  But the City had requested in-camera review of the e-mails, and the trial court had refused it.  The court ruled that the City had a right to in-camera review on request, and that the court should review the e-mails to determine whether they were privileged.