Government Liability Update

Trial Court Should Have Considered Pro Per Plaintiff's Request to Reconsider Summary Judgment as a Motion for Relief

In Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School District, published February 9, 2016, the Second District Court of Appeal, DIvision 7, reversed an order denying a pro per plaintiff's post-judgment motion for relief from the defendant school district's motion for summary judgment.  The plaintiff, a former employee of the district, sued the district for alleged whistleblower retaliation.  The plaintiff's counsel was relieved as counsel of record after performing only limited discovery. The district moved for summary judgment.  The plaintiff filed insufficient opposition papers.  The motion was granted, and judgment signed.  Shortly after judgment was entered, the plaintiff filed a two-page motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment, based on various reasons including abandonment by prior counsel.  The district argued that the motion did not meet the procedural criteria for a reconsideration motion.  The trial court agreed that the motion did not satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 1008's requirements.  It also concluded that, to the extent the motion may constitute a request for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), it couldnot be considered because the motion was not signed under penalty of perjury.  A subsequent motion for reconsideration that the plaintiff filed through new counsel was denied both as untimely under section 473, and based on the ground for denial of the original motion.

The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to consider the reconsideration motion as a motion for relief under section 473, subdivision (b).  The statute specifically states that no affidavit or declaration of merits shall be required of the moving party.  The motion therefore need not be signed under penalty of perjury.  The court remanded the motion to the trial court for consideration.

Prisoner's Allegations That He Is Not Suspect Identified in Warrant, Combined with Physical Discrepancies Between Warrant Subject and Prisoner, May Impose Due Process Obligation on Jailer to Investigate

In Garcia v. County of Riverside, published February 3, 2016, the 9th Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and California state law immunity.  The plaintiff was arrested in Riverside County for driving under the influence.  A search turned up a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department arrest warrantfor a suspect with the same first name, last name, and birth date as the plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleges that when the Riverside Sheriff's Department contacted the LASD, the LASD did not forward information on the warrant subject's last name or biometric description, which differed from plaintiff's.  Plaintiff was transferred to LASD custody.  He alleges that he told both Riverside and LASD personnel that he was not the person in the warrant.  He further alleges that LASD had available information that the warrant subject was a different height and weight than plaintiff, but did not investigate that information.  The plaintiff sued his jailors under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violating his 14th Amendment due process rights, and under California law, for detaining him past the time he should have been released.  

The 9th Circuit held that where a prisoner complains that the prisoner is not the person named in an arrest warrant, and there is sufficient corroborating information (such as the nine-inch difference in height here), the jailer may have a 14th-amendment duty to investigate whether the prisoner is the subject of the warrant.  It affirmed denial of qualified immunity to the former LASD sheriff, on the ground that the law on this subject was clearly established at the time of the jailing.  The public entity defendants could not assert quasi-judicial immunity, because public entities cannot assert absolute immunities to liability under section 1983.  The court affirmed denial of quasi-judicial immunity to the former sheriff in his individual capacity, because the immunity applies only to carrying out the conduct prescribed by a court order such as a warrant.  The plaintiff alleged that the sheriff was not complying with the warrant, because the wrong person was imprisoned.  The 9th Circuit also affirmed denial of state law immunity under Penal Code section 847 (arrests with reasonable cause to believe arrest lawful) and Civil Code 43.55 (arrests pursuant to lawful warrants), because the defendants were not sued for the arrest, but rather the subsequent imprisonment.