In Kramer v. Cullinan, published January 3, 2018, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed denial of summary judgment, sought on the ground of qualified immunity, to a public university's former president. The university employed the plaintiff in a dual role. An audit raised concerns about a conflict of interest, and recommending that a single employee not serve in both roles. The employee responded by drafting resolutions for changing one of the roles he occupied. The defendant consulted legal counsel, who drafted a letter that included language that insurance might not indemnify the plaintiff or others if the plaintiff's or other's actions were determined to have been made in bad faith or or through willful misconduct. The letter was made publicly available at a board meeting. The university did not review the plaintiff's employment. The plaintiff sued the defendant and other university defendants on several grounds. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims, except his claim that because he was terminated without a name-clearing hearing, he was deprived of his liberty interests under the 14th Amendment. The district court concluded that the attorneys' letter contained stigmatizing charges against the plaintiff, that the charges were made public, and that the charges were connected to the plaintiff’s termination. The district court also concluded that the law was clearly established, precluding qualified immunity for the university president.
The 9th Circuit disagreed with the district court's ruling on both prongs of qualified immunity. It concluded that because the letter did not actually accuse the plaintiff of bad faith or willful misconduct, and only set forth conditional language discussing the insurance situation if the plaintiff were determined to have committed bad faith or willful misconduct, it did not set forth stigmatizing charges in connection with his termination that would entitle him to a liberty interest hearing. Further, no law clearly established that such language entitled a terminated public employee to a liberty interest hearing.
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