In Soto v. Unknown Sweetman, published February 9, 2018, a divided 9th Circuit panel affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a pro se prisoner's 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action against several prison guards. The plaintiff alleged that in 2010 he was beaten by the defendant guards. He did not file suit until 2014. The defendants sought summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued that his exhaustion of the state law administrative remedies delayed accrual of his cause of action until exhaustion was complete, since the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires exhaustion before a federal lawsuit is brought. He alternatively argued that exhaustion equitably tolled his time to sue. The district court rejected both arguments.
The 9th Circuit panel unanimously held that the PRLA's exhaustion requirement does not affect the date of accrual of a pro se prisoner's cause of action. The policies served by statutes of limitation are not furthered by delaying the start of the time to sue until exhaustion. The court held that unfairness when the exhaustion period exceeds the statute of limitations is best served by equitably tolling the limitations period during exhaustion.
The majority also held, however, that the plaintiff had failed to raise a factual issue on whether he was entitled to equitable tolling. Although he argued that the exhaustion period took over four years, because he waited for an administrative body to notify him of the conclusion of its investigation before he began the next step of his exhaustion requirement, the majority ruled that he failed to submit sworn evidence that he had relied on the investigation in delaying his exhaustion or that he had diligently pursued his remedies. To the contrary, the evidence showed that the plaintiff did not wait for the conclusion of the investigation before re-starting the administrative exhaustion requirement. It also did not show diligence. He therefore failed to show entitlement to equitable tolling.
A dissenting judge opined that the majority had failed to give the plaintiff the latitude to which pro se prisoners are entitled, and had come up with arguments that the defendants did not make in their answering brief.
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