In Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, published July 3, 2018, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order dismissing a complaint. The plaintiff's biological mother died in a confrontation with police. The plaintiff was the decedent's only living relative. He was adopted out to other parents as an infant. He alleged he maintained a relationship with the decedent throughout her life. He sued the city and its officers under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Title II of the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He asserted two section 1983 claims on his own behalf: a Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of familial relationship, and a related Monell claim. He asserted a Fourth Amendment claim and the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims on behalf of the decedent. The complaint named "Doe 1" as the representative of the decedent's estate. The district court concluded that the plaintiff had no standing, and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.
The 9th Circuit held that under 42 U.S.C. section 1988(a), which borrows state law to fill gaps in federal law where it is not inconsistent with federal law, California's survival statute applies to section 1983 actions. Because the plaintiff was neither a successor in interest to the decedent nor a personal representative of his estate, he had no standing to bring claims on behalf of the decedent's estate. Application is not inconsistent with section 1983 law, particularly since a claim could have been brought by a personal representative if one had been appointed during the statute of limitations. Section 1988(a) does not apply to the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the uniform law concerning the survival of federal claims applies. Under that law, an individual with no legal relationship to the decedent, such as the plaintiff, cannot bring survival claims. An adopted-out child does not have a sufficient relationship with a biological parent to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of a familial relationship with the parent. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining leave to amend so that the plaintiff could seek appointment as personal representative and replace Doe 1 as the representative plaintiff. Such an amendment would bring in a new party, and the party's claim would not relate back to the original filing of the complaint. The statute of limitations had run by the time the motion to dismiss was heard.
Judge Wardlaw concurred in the result, but advised that in future cases different parent-child relationships i might be treated differently.
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