In Sandoval v. City of Santa Rosa, published December 21, 2018, the 9th Circuit affirmed a district court's summary judgment rulings for plaintiffs and defendants in a case brought by two drivers whose vehicles were impounded by a defendant city or defendant county because the drivers had current or expired Mexican driver's licenses (and passengers with California driver's licenses) but did not themselves have California-issued driver's licenses. The seizures were under California Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1), which provides a police officer may impound a vehicle for 30 days if the vehicle's driver had never been issued a driver's license. The statute did not define "driver's license." The city and county interpreted the term to refer to a California-issued driver's license. The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment in their monetary claims against the city and county for propounding policies that violated the Fourth Amendment. It granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' claims under the Bane Act, Civil Code section 52.1.
The 9th Circuit had previously held that 30-day impounds under the statute are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes. The question was whether the impounds were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court ruled that under the circumstances, they were unreasonable warrantless seizures. The "community caretaking" exception does not categorically permit impounding private property simply because a state law allows the impoundment. Further, the exception would not apply past the point where the community caretaking function is discharged. Once the drivers were able to provide a licensed driver who could take possession of the truck, the community caretaking function of preventing improperly licensed drivers from driving was discharged. There was no dispute that the seizures were under city and county policies. The defendants argued that the seizures could not support Monell liability because they were legal under state law. The 9th Circuit avoided that issue by ruling that the statute, interpreted in harmony with Vehicle Code sections 310 and 100, a driver who had been issued a driver's license in a foreign jurisdiction for the type of vehicle seized has not violated Vehicle Code section 14602.6. The defendants did not violate the Bane Act, however, because if the right at issue is not clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case, specific intent to violate the plaintiff's rights--an element of the Bane Act claim--cannot be implied. Because the 9th Circuit's ruling that an impoundment under the statute implicated the Fourth Amendment post-dated the seizure, the right violated was not clearly established and intent could not be implied.
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