In Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, published February 4, 2019, the California Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a lower appellate court's ruling on anti-SLAPP special motions to strike. The plaintiff allegedly entered into an exclusive contract with the defendant city to act as the city's exclusive agent in negotiating with the NFL to build a home stadium in the city for an NFL team. The plaintiff alleged that while it was representing the city, the city stopped complying with the agreement, and worked with another defendant vendor to act as the city's agents in NFL negotiations. The plaintiff further alleged that before the plaintiff signed the agreement with the city, the city attorney told the plaintiff that the two-year contract would be extended; but when the plaintiff sought an extension, the city council voted to deny the extension. The plaintiff sued the city for breach of contract and promissory fraud; sued the city, mayor, and the other vendor for fraud; and sued the other vendor for intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The defendants made special motions to strike the causes the action, which the trial court granted. The appellate court reversed, concluding the causes of action did not arise from conduct protected by anti-SLAPP.
The Supreme Court concluded that the causes of action against the city were not protected by anti-SLAPP. The crux of those claims is that the defendants allegedly concealed and lied about the city's alleged breach of its exclusivity provision. These were not protected communications under subdivision (e)(2) or (e)(4) of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. To meet (e)(2)'s definition of protected conduct--written or oral statements or writings made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative body--the defendant's acts that form the basis of the claim must be statements in connection with an issue being considered by the legislative body (here, the city council) at the time the statements are made. Alleged lies about whether the other vendor was representing the city in NFL negotiations were not connected with any issue which was before the city council at that time. Subdivision (e)(4)--conduct in furtherance of the exercise of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest--also was not satisfied. Although the building of the stadium was an issue of public interest, the alleged conversations on who should represent the city in NFL negotiations did not. The same considerations apply to the city attorney's alleged promises. Since they were not made when the agreement renewal was pending before the city council, they were not made in connection with an issue that was then under review by the city council. And the issue of whether the agreement with a vendor would be renewed was not in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest.
The court also concluded, however, that the tortious interference causes of action against the other vendor did involve protected conduct. They were based on the other vendor's communications with the NFL on the stadium issue (an issue of public interest), and were made in connection with the issue of the agreement with plaintiff that was at that time before the city council.
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