In Roger v. County of Riverside, published January 22, 2020, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2 reversed a judgment for the defendant county entered on demurrer and summary judgment. The plaintiff was a physician whom the court held in contempt when he refused to produce documents a court-appointed receiver requested to be produced in a civil case. Unknown to the plaintiff, when he was booked, the county sheriff's department entered the charge into the Jail Information Management System as a felony, even though it was a civil violation; and reported the felony charge to the California Department of Justice. When he was released from jail, he learned from a hospital with which he had staff privileges that he had failed to report to them a felony arrest. He believed his arrest was for a civil charge, and that the letter was a mistake. Six months after arrest, the plaintiff's girlfriend asked the jail to remove the felony designations. She was told the designation would disappear shortly. A month later, a group health practice terminated its contract with the plaintiff. Four months after this event, the plaintiff presented a claim for damages to the county. The claim form asked when the damage or injury occurred. The plaintiff listed the date his contract was terminated, "and ongoing." Among the documents he attached was the printout from JIMS reflecting the booking date and the date the charge was listed as a felony. The county sent a summary notice that it had rejected his claim. The defendants later changed the felony listing to a misdemeanor, which was also incorrect. The plaintiff sued the county and sheriff's deparatment for defamation, writ of mandamus, declaratory relief, and a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim for failure to train. The writ of mandate he sought was to prohibit the defendants from designating civil contempt as criminal charges rather than civil; and a declaration that the defendants had falsely reported that he had been charged with a felony and later changed it to a misdemeanor. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the section 1983 claims on the ground that the plaintiff had inadequately pleaded failure to train. It later granted summary judgment as to the defamation claim, on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was untimely. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the writ and declaratory relief claims. The court denied the motion on the ground the claims were moot. The parties stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the defamation claim. The claim was untimely, because a defamation cause of action accrues at the time of publication, not at the time of injury. But the county waived the claim's untimeliness, because it failed to serve a notice of untimeliness. The county argued that it relied on the date of injury stated in the claim, and that it had no duty to investigate to determine whether the claim was untimely. But the county form did not ask when the claim accrued; it asked when the injury occurred. For defamation, the date of injury did not determine the claim date. Further, the JIMS printout attached to the claim did list the accrual date: The date the felony charge was published. Since the purpose of the claim was to enable the county to investigate the charge, it was disingenuous for the county to argue that it had no duty to investigate by looking at the documents attached to the claim. While an entity has no duty to investigate to determine timeliness, it fails to do so at the risk of waiving a timeliness defense in litigation. By not notifying the plaintiff his claim was late, the county deprived him of the right to pursue late-claim relief and explain he did not discover the publication until nearly a year after publication.
The appellate court rejected the alternative ground for summary judgment that the defamation claim was barred by Government Code section 821.6 prosecutorial immunity. The immunity extends to discretionary decisions in the course of investigation and prosecution, such as charging the plaintiff with contempt. But the defendants were not involved in the prosecution of plaintiff, and recording the charge was a ministerial act. It was therefore not subject to the immunity.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the failure to train charge. Complaints need only allege ultimate facts, particularly where the entity has superior knowledge of the facts. The defendants had superior knowledge of their training, so the complaint did not need to plead details.
Finally, the writ cause of action was not moot, because the facts showed the events here could be repeated in other cases, and the matter of reporting charges was a matter of public interest.