In Julian Volunteer Fire Company Association v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection District (County of San Diego), published March 30, 2021, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed a judgment against the petitioner association in a Brown Act lawsuit. The association provided fire prevention and emergency services through a local fire district. The district voted to seek to dissolve and be replaced by the county fire authority. This triggered a mandatory review process by the Local Agency Formation Commission. Two weeks after the district's board approved the dissolution resolution, the association sued the district, alleging the resolution approval violated the Brown Act. The association sought a writ of mandate ordering the district to vacate the resolution. While the lawsuit was pending, the county and commission processed the resolution, including holding public hearings and triggering a special election. The district initially opposed the association's lawsuit. But after a board membership change, the board disagreed with the earlier dissolution resolution. It therefore no longer contested the lawsuit. The association waited to prosecute its lawsuit until after the special election results in favor of dissolution. The association then moved ex parte to enter judgment on the Brown Act claims. The district told the court it did not oppose the motion. The court entered judgment for the association and issued the writ. The association, relying on this judgment, then filed suit seeking to preclude the commission from certifying the election result favoring dissolution. The county and commission then intervened in the Brown Act lawsuit as necessary or indispensable parties. They successfully moved to vacate the judgment and writ. The trial court stated it was not previously aware of these parties' direct interests in the litigation. The court then granted the intervenors judgment on the pleadings on a number of grounds, including laches.
The court of appeal agreed that laches barred the lawsuit. Laches requires the defendant to show unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Even if a plaintiff timely files a complaint, laches can bar relief if the plaintiff unreasonably delays in bringing the litigation to completion. Here, the association did not seek a ruling on the merits for about one year, while the dissolution process proceeded. The association then rushed to the courthouse, without opposition from the sole opposing party, and obtained a judgment it sought to use against the interested entities. Nothing in the record shows justification for the delay; and the association could have obtained a ruling on its claims much earlier had it sought to do so. The association's deliberate decision to wait and see whether the special election or other proceedings would have mooted the Brown Act claim underscores the unreasonableness of the association's actions. An action to rescind a public agency’s resolution for violating the Brown Act is subject to an unusually short limitations period because it is vital that the validity of an agency’s actions be resolved expeditiously. A party cannot justify waiting to resolve Brown Act allegations pertaining to an initial agency decision merely because other avenues exist for achieving similar results. The prejudice is obvious from the record: the association caused the county and commission to incur substantial costs to comply with the statutorily required proceedings while it waited to challenge the initiating decision.
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