In Seidner v. De Vries, published June 30, 2022, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case based on alleged use of excessive force. The plaintiff was riding his bicycle on a well-lit street without a front light, in violation of state law. The defendant officer pulled his car ahead of the plaintiff to confirm the violation, and activated his lights. As the officer stepped out of his car to talk to the plaintiff, the plaintiff continued pedaling past the officer and began to flee. The officer got back into the car and pursue the bicyclist, who was traveling around 15 miles per hour. The officer accelerated, pulled his car at an angle across the street, and stopped. As the officer started to step out of the car, the plaintiff's bicycle crashed into the car. The plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued the officer for use of excessive force. The district court denied the officer's motion for summary judgment, ruling that a jury could find the use of force excessive and that the law clearly established that the conduct could constitute excessive force. The officer brought an interlocutory appeal.
The panel majority ruled that the officer was not entitled to summary judgment on the first prong of qualified immunity (whether the officer violated the right at issue) but was entitled to summary judgment on the second prong (whether the law was clearly established). On the first prong, under the circumstances, the officer used an intermediate level of force in setting up a roadblock in front of a fleeing bicycle, particularly since the bike crashed into the car rather than the car hitting the bike. The government's interest in using force for a minor bicycle violation was low, but once the plaintiff started fleeing, the government had an interest justifying some use of force to stop him from fleeing despite how the incident arose. To conclude otherwise would hamstring law enforcement officers in trying to hold suspects on bikes accountable for unlawful conduct. Under the circumstances, the court cannot say as a matter of law that a jury would be compelled to find the way the officer used his car to stop the bicyclist reasonable. There was therefore an issue of fact on reasonableness that prevented summary judgment on the first prong. On the second prong, there was no law at the time of the incident that put beyond debate that the officer's use of his car as a roadblock for a bicyclist under similar circumstances would be excessive force. The law was therefore not clearly established, and the officer was entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
One judge concurred that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the second prong, but would hold that the use of force was excessive.
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