In Flores v. City of San Diego, published September 15, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 reversed summary judgment granted to the defendant city. A motorcycle operator died while being pursued by police. The operator's survivors sued the city for wrongful death. The city moved for summary judgment based on the immunity under Vehicle Code section 17004.7. Section 17004.7 immunizes public agencies from liability under Vehicle Code section 17001 if the agencies satisfy the statutory requirements for promulgating, adopting, and training officers on a vehicular pursuit policy. The statute requires "regular and periodic training," which the statute defines as complying, at a minimum, with the training guidelines established pursuant to Penal Code section 13519.8. Penal Code section 13519.8, in turn, authorizes the Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) Commission to set standards pertaining to state-wide training of officers in the handling of high-speed vehicle pursuits. The defendant department used a 25 minute, 50 second video to train officers on its pursuit policy. POST Regulation 1081 require a minimum of one hour training annually on high-speed vehicle pursuit training. The plaintiffs contended that because the city's pursuit policy training did not meet the one-hour minimum annual training regulation, the city was not entitled to immunity under section 17004.7. The trial court granted summary judgment.
The appellate court concluded that the city had to meet the POST regulation's requirement of at least one hour training on the pursuit policy annually. The court rejected the city's argument that the regulation applied only to entry-level training. It further rejected the argument that the regulation does not apply to discretionary training such as vehicle pursuit policy training; if an agency wishes to avail itself of the section 17004.7 immunity, the training and adherence to the POST regulation become mandatory. The court further rejected the argument that POST was not statutorily authorized to adopt minimum time standards for the training. Because the City failed to show that its officers received a minimum of one hour training on the policy annually, it was not entitled to summary judgment.
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