In Murguia v. Langdon, published March 14, 2023, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part an order dismissing a suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The plaintiff called 911 seeking emergency mental health assistance for his ex-wife, with whom he lived and had five children, including infant twins. The mother was displaying bizarre behavior. In response to the call, the first group of officers separated the mother and her twins from the plaintiff, and allowed the mother and a friend of hers to take the twins to church. They prevented the plaintiff from following. An officer from another agency then drove the mother and twins from the church to a woman's shelter. A county social worker then allegedly provided incorrect information about the mother to officers from a third agency, who transported the mother and twins to a motel, and left them unsupervised. The mother then drowned the twins in a bathtub. The plaintiff sued all of the involved officers and social worker for allegedly violating his 14th amendment rights to substantive due process. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.
The 9th Circuit majority reversed the dismissal in part. The only two exceptions to the general rule against failure-to-act claims under section 1983 are those for special relationships and state-created danger. There was no special relationship here, because the twins were never under the defendants' custody. A state-created danger claim could be asserted against those defendant who created or enhanced any danger to the twins. The panel upheld dismissal as to the first group of officers, since the facts alleged did not show they created or enhanced any danger to the twins by leaving the mother and twins with the mother’s friend. The panel changed the dismissal to one without prejudice, since the plaintiff might be able to amend the allegations. The majority held that the plaintiff adequately stated a claim against the officer who arranged for the mother to stay at the hotel room, transported the mother and twins from the shelter to the hotel room, and left the mother in the room with the twins. The plaintiff adequately pleaded both danger enhancement/creation and deliberate indifference to the risk that the mother would harm the twins. The majority also concluded the plaintiff adequately pleaded a state-created danger claim against the social worker, for allegedly providing false information about the mother to police. By providing that information, she enhanced the danger to the twins by foreclosing the return of the twins to their father. Following precedent, the panel found the claim for infringement on the plaintiff’s liberty interest from removal of the twins from him, and giving them to the other parent with custody of the twins, failed; it was a relatively minor infringement of the right that was insufficient to form a section 1983 claim. The plaintiff also failed to plead a cause of action for seizure of his person based on the officers preventing him from following the twins. They did not prevent the plaintiff from leaving his house for any other purpose. Having found potential individual liability, the majority reversed denial of the Monell claim against the municipalities involved.
One judge dissented from the portions of the decision reversing dismissal. The judge opined that the state-created-danger doctrine should apply only where officials abuse their power by intentionally putting a person in harm’s way. The judge contended that the majority’s decision extended the doctrine to injuries caused by negligence and mistake.
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