In Brown v. City of Inglewood, ordered published June 30, 2023, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 1 reversed in part a trial court decision denying an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. The plaintiff was the elected treasurer of the defendant city. She alleged that after she reported concerns about financial improprieties, the city and members of the city council retaliated against her by reducing her duties and authority, reducing her salary by 83 percent, taking away her seat on the dais at council meetings, and temporarily locking her and her staff out of her office. The defendants produced declarations and other evidence that the reduction in authority and salary plaintiff complained of were enacted by ordinances passed by the council; that because she is not a member of the council, the treasurer has no standing to sit on the dais, and that a previous practice of allowing the treasurer to sit on the dais was discontinued when plaintiff purportedly became disruptive during meetings; and that the plaintiff's entry badge was temporarily deactivated when she failed to present a negative COVID-19 test. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to the plaintiff's claim for defamation, and her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to the extent it was based on defamation, but denied it as to the plaintiff's claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 (protection from liability for whistleblower employees) and for IIED based on alleged retaliation. The defendants appealed denial of the anti-SLAPP motion.
The appellate court held that the retaliation-based claims against the individual defendants arose from activity protected under anti-SLAPP. The individual defendants did not have authority to reduce the plaintiff's authority or salary except by voting on ordinances or policies. After they pass an ordinance or policy, the acts implementing the ordinance or policy are the city's rather than the individuals. Elected officials' votes taken after a public hearing are protected activity under anti-SLAPP. The plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants also retaliated against her by removing her from the dais. But that removal alone is not sufficiently material to satisfy the elements of her retaliation claims. The court then analyzed the second prong of anti-SLAPP: Whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that the claims were legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted is credible. The section 1102.5 retaliation claim was not legally sufficient, because an elected official is not an "employee" for purposes of that statute. Although the Legislature has defined "employees" to include elected officials in other statutes, it chose not to do so in section 1102.5. The retaliation-based IIED claim against the individual defendants failed, because it is subsumed under the exclusive remedy provisions of worker's compensation. The worker's compensation statutes, unlike section 1102.5, do include elected officials in their definition of "employees." The trial court therefore should have granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to the individual defendants.
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