In Johnson v. Barr. published July 6, 2023, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment granted by the district court. The defendant police officer approached a woman with her children parked next to a park at night. After questioning the woman, finding out she had been drinking, and noting what they believed to be signs of intoxication, they arrested the woman and booked her on one count of public intoxication under Penal Code section 647(f) and five counts of felony child endangerment under Penal Code section 273a(a). The children were placed with child protective services. After the woman and her husband (who had also been arrested) paid bail, they were released and picked up their children. The district attorney declined to prosecute the woman and her husband, and dropped all charges. The woman sued under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging unlawful and unreasonable arrest under the Fourth Amendment, interference with and retaliation against free exercise of expression under the First Amendment, unlawful and unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. She also asserted state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, Bane Act violations, trespass to chattals, and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, finding both probable cause and qualified immunity.
The 9th Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the state law claims. Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff presented a jury question. Probable cause is present if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Some bases on which the defendants attempted to claim probable cause were not supported by the record. Other facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, suggest probable cause to arrest. Since a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff, summary judgment based on probable cause was not appropriate. But the section 1983 claims are still subject to qualified immunity. Even where there is not probable cause to arrest, officers are entitled to qualified immunity so long as reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the arrest. Although officers might seem to lack probable cause under the prudent person standard, a reasonable officer on the ground might perceive the situation differently. An officer would not be on notice that his or her action was unreasonable unless all reasonable officers would agree that there was no probable cause in this instance. The plaintiff did not sufficiently show how her arrest violated a clearly established right to be free from an unlawful arrest when the undisputed evidence presented before the district court does not show that every reasonable officer would be on notice that these actions were unconstitutional. The plaintiff did not adequately identify cases that indicated the defendants' actions in arresting her were clearly prohibited, especially in light of the undisputed facts established by the body cam footage of the incident. A a plain reading of the public intoxication and child endangerment statutes does not demonstrate that a reasonable officer should have known that the plaintiff's actions were clearly not prohibited. The majority affirmed summary judgment on the federal claims, and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on the state law false arrest and negligence claims, which were premised on a finding of probable cause as a matter of law. The court affirmed summary judgment on the other state law claims, on non-probable-cause grounds. A concurring/dissenting judge opined that the appellate court should have remanded all of the state law claims to the district court to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
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