In Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School District, published December 21, 2023, a divided panel of the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's lawsuit after demurrer. A plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant district in state court, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and failure to perform a mandatory duty, based on alleged sexual misconduct. The district demurred to the action. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend on some causes of action and without leave on others. The plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, then dismissed the action voluntarily, without prejudice. Other plaintiffs filed a similar lawsuit in state court against the district. As with the other lawsuit, the court sustained demurrer, with leave to amend as to some causes of action, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit without prejudice. On the same day the requests for dismissal were entered in the two actions, the plaintiffs in the two suits sued the district in federal district court. The complaint asserted the causes of action previously alleged in the state court actions, and added causes of action under Title VIII of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The school district moved to dismiss the action, asserting 11th Amendment immunity to the federal claims except TItle IX. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the federal action under FRCP 41(a). The plaintiffs then filed another state court action against the district. The complaint asserted causes of action for negligence, negligent hiriing, and negligent supervision. It did not assert any federal claims. The district demurred to the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The trial court sustained the demurrer, ruling that the dismissal in federal court was an adjudication on the merits, and res judicata barred the new lawsuit.
The panel majority agreed. It ruled that the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' federal lawsuit, because the district was immune under the 11th Amendment. The district acknowledged in the federal suit that the federal court had jurisdiction over the Title IX claim, which was predicated on the same harm as the other causes of action. The preclusive effect of a federal court judgment is determined by federal common law. Where the federal court had federal question jurisdiction, rather than diversity jurisdiction, federal common law requires application of uniform federal rules of res judicata. FRCP 41(a)(1)(A) allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a lawsuit without prejudice before a defendant moves for summary judgment. But FRCP 41(a)(1)(B) provides that if the plaintiff previously dismissed any state or federal action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. Federal law is that a second voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(B) is claim preclusive. Here, the Doe claims constitute a single cause of action, because they are all based on the same alleged harm: The injury and damages caused by the alleged sexual misconduct. The majority held that U.S. Supreme Court law dictated that in federal subject matter cases (as opposed to diversity cases) those federal claim preclusion rules should apply to successive dismissals, to avoid forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws, and prevents unreasonable abuse and harassment by preventing plaintiffs from obtaining numerous dismissals without prejudice. The court declined to follow Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, which held that a second dismissal in a federal court did not preculde filing the same claim in a third action in state court with only state court causes of action. The majority opined that Gray was contrary to U.S. Supreme Court law.
A dissenting justice opined that state court claim preclusion laws should apply, and should allow the state court action to proceed.
Comments