In Hart v. City of Redwood City, published April 19, 2024, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision denying the defendant police officer's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The plaintiff witnessed her husband cutting his own throat with a utility knife in front of one of their children. She took the knife from him. As she called 911, he retrieved a different knife and again began cutting his throat, arms, and chest in their backyard. As two officers arrived, the plaintiff met them in the front yard. She was uninjured but covered in blood and frantically pleading for the officers to help her husband. The defendant officer took the lead and instructed the other officer to "go less lethal with the taser" while he "would go lethal with [his] firearm." Entering the backyard, they saw the husband in the backyard holding the knife. The defendant officer yelled "drop the knife" twice. Instead of doing so, the husband began moving towards the officers while holding the knife. He crossed the backyard to within a few feet of the officers in less than 5.9 seconds. The officer using the taser fired it, but it was ineffective because only one probe hit the husband. The defendant officer fired five shots, striking the husband three times in the upper torso. He passed away. The plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the defendant officer summary judgment, relying on 9th Circuit case law that it is objectively unreasonable to shoot an unarmed man who has not committed a serious offense, is mentally or emotionally disturbed, has been given no warning, poses no risk of flight, and presents no reasonable risk of injury to the officers or others. The district court concluded that the husband was not "armed" as the term is commonly understood; and that even if he was, it may still have been unreasonable to use lethal force because the husband may have been mentally unstable.
The appellate court ruled that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. His use of force was objectively reasonable. The most important factor in weighing use of force is whether the suspect posed an immediate threat. The husband posed an immediate threat to the defendant officer. He was holding a knife; he held the knife towards the officers as he approached them; he was non-communicative; he failed to respond to or comply with the order to drop the knife; and he crossed the yard within close range of the officers within 5.9 seconds. The officers had only seconds to react. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the use of force was unreasonable because the situation developed too quickly. That may be unreasonable where the officers themselves unnecessarily create their own sense of urgency. But here, the officers responded quickly to an emergency who posed an immediate threat. That the suspect had already harmed himself did not lessen his threat. Even the plaintiffs' expert, who otherwise criticized the officers, conceded the husband posed an immediate threat at the time lethal force was used. Another Graham v. Connor factor, the severity of the crime at issue, supported use of force; the husband's approach while carrying a deadly weapon may have constituted an assault on the officers, and his refusal to drop the weapon while exhibiting a deadly weapon was resisting arrest. His failure to drop the knife combined with approaching the officers establishes he was actively resisting arrest. The totality of the circumstances establish that the Graham standard for use of lethal force was satisfied. That the husband may have been mentally ill does not remove the case from the Graham standard and is considered in view of the surrounding circumstances. Given the speed at which the events unfolded, a warning would not have been feasible. Even if the officer's conduct had violated the 4th Amendment, he would have been entitled to qualified immunity on the second prong of the immunity, because the law did not clearly establish that his conduct was unconstitutional. Other 9th Circuit cases involving mentally ill suspects were distinguishable.
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