In Juarez v. San Bernardino Unified School District, published November 25, 2024, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 reversed the trial court’s decision sustaining demurrer to the plaintiffs’ complaint and dismissing the case. The plaintiffs alleged that one of the plaintiffs found a cellphone on the ground, and placed it in his truck. Later, when the plaintiffs were outside of one of the plaintiff’s homes, an officer of the defendant district tracked his cellphone to their location. He approached the plaintiffs, carrying his firearm and with his badge clipped to his belt. He identified himself as a police officer for the district, displayed his badge, and demanded they comply with his commands. He then pulled his firearm, cocked it, and aimed it at the plaintiffs outside the house, while another plaintiff watched from inside the house. He demanded they turn over the cellphone. The plaintiff who found the cellphone retrieved the phone from his truck and attempted to hand it to the officer. The officer ordered him to put the phone on the ground. As the plaintiff went to do so, the officer struck the plaintiff in the face with his gun, causing the plaintiff to fall and lose consciousness. The officer took pictures of the plaintiffs, and told them he knew who they were. The officer later pled guilty to assault by a police officer and threatening the other plaintiffs under color of law. He admitted he acted under color of authority as a district police officer when he detained the plaintiffs and assaulted one of them. The plaintiffs sued the officer and the district, asserting multiple causes of action. The complaint alleged the district was liable under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a) (respondeat superior liability). The court sustained the district’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing the officer acted in the course and scope of his employment.
The appellate court disagreed. The scope of employment is interpreted broadly under the respondeat superior doctrine. The employer will not be held vicariously liable for an employee’s malicious or tortious conduct if the employee substantially deviates from the employment duties for personal purposes. If the employee inflicts injury out of personal malice, not engendered by the employment, or acts out of personal malice unconnected with the employment, or if the misconduct is not an outgrowth of the employment, the employee is acting outside the scope of employment. Here, however, the complaint alleged that as a district officer, the officer had a duty to ensure the safety and security of district property. It alleged that the district authorized and equipped the officer to use force to seize evidence and prevent its destruction. It cited Penal Code section 830.32 as authorizing the officer to arrest someone if he had probable cause to believe they had committed a felony. The complaint alleged that the officer used his cellphone to perform his job, and that he sought to retrieve it to be able to perform his job. The plaintiffs therefore asserted multiple plausible theories for how the officer’s search for the phone was connected to his employment. A fact-finder could conclude that the officer acted within the scope of his duties in attempting to retrieve the phone. Further, a fact-finder could reasonably infer that retrieving what the officer believed to be his stolen phone was an act necessary to his comfort, convenience, health, and welfare. That is another standard for activities within the scope of duty. Finally, it is reasonable to infer that an officer’s conduct in drawing a firearm, identifying himself as an officer, and demanding that others comply with his commands were all actions signaling that he sought to detain or arrest someone. Whether he was actually doing so is for the trier of fact to determine.
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