Government Liability Update

Pullman Abstention Applies to Regulatory Takings Suit in Federal Court Due to Eminent Domain Case in State Court

In Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, published December 8, 2022, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court decision granting the defendant city's motion to abstain under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. (1941)  312 U.S. 496 from hearing the plaintiffs' regulatory takings case while the city's eminent domain suit regarding the same property was pending in state court.  The plaintiffs own parcels of land in areas zoned for restricted land use.  The plaintiffs contended that under California's SB 330, intended to increase the stock of affordable housing, the city was required to approve their project.  The city contended that SB 330 did not require approval, because the plaintiffs had not met the city's development requirements.  Shortly after rejecting the plaintiffs' application, the city informed the plaintiffs that it intended to acquire their property through eminent domain.  The plaintiffs rejected the city's purchase offer.  The plaintiffs then filed their regulatory takings action in federal court.  A week later, the city filed an eminent domain action in state court.  The city then filed their motion to abstain.

The 9th Circuit agreed with the district court that Pullman abstention was appropriate.  The court rejected the arguments that the Supreme Court's decisions in Knick v. Township of Scott (2019) 139 S. Ct. 2162 (holding that landowners need not exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing a federal takings action) and Pakdel v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 141 S. Ct. 2226 (holding that landowners need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a federal takings action) precluded abstention.  Those cases address when a takings claim is ripe, which goes to when a claim accrues for purposes of judicial review.  Abstention allows courts to stay cases that have already accrued.  It does not create a condition precedent to litigation.  It merely serves federalism by allowing a state court to decide state-law issues in the first instance.  There is not a danger of claim preclusion:  the state court can adjudicate the eminent domain action without reaching the regulatory takings issue.  The two suits compensate property owners for different injuries.  Eminent domain compensates for the forced sale of properties to the government by transferring the land to the government and paying the owner the property's fair market value as of the date the government made a deposit on the property.  A regulatory takings action compensates the owner for the economic impact of a regulation on distinct investment-backed expectations regarding property.  The landowners can defend the eminent domain action without addressing the constitutionality of the city's regulations, and recover the fair market value of the property as restricted by those regulations; then litigate their regulatory taking claim and recover ddamages for the economic impact of the regulation.  Further, the plaintiffs had made an England reservation in the state proceedings, reserving their right to litigate federal issues in their federal action.  The court of appeals also ruled that the Pullman abstention requirements were satisfied.  The complaint touched upon a sensitive area of social policy--land use planning.  The constitutional questions in the regulatory takings action could be narrowed by a ruling in the state case, because the state court will have to interpret the local regulation and SB 330 to ascertain the fair market value of the property.  Finally, the litigation involves an unclear question of state law: the interaction of SB 330 and the local regulation.

In Split of Authority, Appellate Court Holds That Claimant Can Argue Actual Claim Compliance in Government Code Section 946.6 Petition for Relief from Late Claim

In Simms v. Bear Valley Community Health Care District, published June 28, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2 reversed an order denying a Government Code section 946.6 petition for relief from the claim requirements and dismissing the case.  The respondent is a local health care district.  On December 8, 2017, the plaintiff was injured and sought treatment at the district’s emergency room.  In December 2017 and January 2018, he went to appointments with several district providers to obtain additional treatment.  He verbally complained about his treatment on December 26, 2017 and January 26, 2018, alleging the providers were refusing to investigate and treat his complaints because they perceived him as trying to obtain drugs on false pretenses.  The district responded to the complaints with a January 30, 2018 letter.  Appointments in March and April 2018 also did not meet the plaintiff’s expectations.  On April 24, 2018, the District sent plaintiff a “formal notice” that it would no longer serve as his primary care provider.  On May 13, 2018, the plaintiff sent the district a letter, framed as a response to the January 30, 2018 letter.  In the letter, he complained about his treatment.  He demanded all references to “drug seeking behavior” be removed from his medical records, and that he receive a written apology from one doctor.  He threatened that if he continued to be “defamed, harassed, mistreated, and ignored” by the district, he would “take his concerns to a higher level” by “filing a lawsuit for restitution.”  The district did not respond to this letter.  On July 11, 2019, Simms sent the district a letter framed as a Code of Civil Procedure section 364 notice, addressed to the same District employee as the May 2018 letter.  In this letter, the plaintiff wrote he intended to file a medical malpractice suit against the district.  He represented that in July and September 2018 he had received results of MRI scans that revealed spinal injuries from the 2017 fall that the district had failed to diagnose, resulting in further damage and delay of treatment.  He also complained of withdrawal symptoms from failure to prescribe medications.  The district treated this letter as a claim under the Government Claims Act.  It responded with a Notice of Return of Late claim.  On July 30, 2019, the plaintiff applied to the district for leave to present a late claim.  The district denied it on August 20, 2019.  On November 18, 2019, plaintiff petitioned the trial court under Government Code section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement.  The court denied the petition.  It ruled that the May 2018 letter did not comply with the Government Claims Act’s requirements, and could not be deemed either a claim or a defective claim.  It further found that the plaintiff had failed to show entitlement to relief.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court should have treated the plaintiff’s May 2018 letter as a defective claim; the district had waived any defect by failing to timely serve a Notice of Insufficiency; and therefore the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to proceed with a lawsuit alleging causes of action encompassed by that claim.  The court acknowledged the split of authority among appellate courts on whether a party could assert in a section 946.6 petition that the claimant had actually submitted a timely claim, or whether the argument could only be made in a subsequent lawsuit.  The court decided that it would side with the courts allowing a petition to show actual compliance, so long as the issue did not depend on disputed issues of fact that would have to be submitted to a jury.  Where raised in an appeal from a claim-relief proceeding, after having been argued fully in the trial court and submitted on appeal without reservation or argument that the issue remains pending below, the issue of actual compliance is properly addressed on appeal. The court further observed that the notices a public entity is statutorily required to send to a claimant whose claim is untimely, or whose late-claim applications are denied, are inaccurate for claimants who actually submitted a timely claim, in that they advise the claimant that the “only recourse” is to follow the late-claim procedure.  The issue of whether the plaintiff’s May 2018 letter qualified as a claim, or as a “claim as presented” or “trigger claim” that triggered the district’s duty to respond with a Notice of Insufficiency, is an issue of law the appellate court reviews de novo.  The letter communicated that he felt he had compensable claims for defamation and medical malpractice against the district, and that if it was not settled he would bring a suit for restitution—i.e., damages.  It therefore qualified as a “claim as presented,” and the district waived its defects by not sending a timely Notice of Insufficiency.  The district contended that the plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until the MRI scans he had after he sent the letter.  But his causes of action accrued when he sustained injury and suspected a negligent cause, which could have been as early as December 2017 or January 2018, when he orally complained.  The plaintiff failed to present a late-claim application within a year of accrual, which deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant him relief from the claim requirements.  But it did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to deem his claim actually timely.  The issue of whether the statute of limitations for filing suit had also passed.  Although the two-year statute of limitations under Government Code section 945.6(a)(2) would have expired by May 2020, the court deemed the statute of limitations equitably tolled as of January 10, 2020, when the trial court found the May 2018 letter was neither a claim nor a defective claim.  As of that date, the plaintiff was bound by claim preclusion from filing suit and arguing that he had complied with the claim requirement.  The tolling period would run through the remittitur on the appeal.  The appellate court directed the trial court to deny the petition for relief without prejudice to the plaintiff filing a complaint and proceeding with a lawsuit.

Public Employer That Establishes by Undisputed Evidence It Had Legitimate Independent Reasons for Releasing Employee from Probation Entitled to Summary Judgment against Whistleblower Claim

In Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento, ordered published June 1, 2022, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the defendant county in a whistleblower retaliation suit under Labor Code section 1102.5.  The plaintiff, an administrative analyst, was promoted to an administrative services officer position.  The position was probationary for six months.  The plaintiff complained about her job duties in her new position, which she believed did not rise to the level of her position.  After her report, the plaintiff felt mistreated on several occasions, which she believed was attributable to her complaints.  Her supervisor eventually recommended that the plaintiff be released from probation on the alleged grounds that she had been insubordinate, disrespectful, and dishonest in her actions.  The trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the county had met its burden of showing plaintiff could not allege a prima facie cause of retaliation because she had not alleged or presented evidence of protected conduct under section 1102.5, because she did not have a reasonable belief the county had violated a specific federal, state, or local law or regulation, but instead had only shown she complained about internal personnel matters.  The court further ruled that the county had presented evidence it had a legitimate business reason for releasing the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had failed to raise a triable issue of material fact to support that the reason was pretext.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court's analysis was incorrect, but nevertheless affirmed summary judgment.  The three-stage analysis the trial court had applied was disapproved for Labor Code section 1102.5 cases in Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, because it fails to acknowledge Labor Code section 1102.6.  Section 1102.6 provides that once the plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by Section 1102.5 was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited action against the employee, the employer shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.  Therefore, under section 1102.6, once the plaintiff has met her burden, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity.  The plaintiff need not show the reason was pretextual.  The appellate court also questioned whether the correct test for a prima facie case is whether the plaintiff had a "reasonable belief," as multiple cases hold, since section 1102.5 actually refers to a "reasonable cause to believe."  The appellate court ultimately did not resolve that issue, because it ruled that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that the county had carried its burden under section 1102.6 by presenting undisputed evidence that it had a legitimate business reason to release the plaintiff--that she was insubordinate, disrespectful, and dishonest in her actions.

Executive Orders Extended Deadline to Present Claims for Damages, but Not Deadline to Apply for Leave to Present Late Claim

In Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agency, published December 29, 2021, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6 affirmed a trial court order denying a petition for relief from the claim requirements under Government Code section 946.6.  The petitioner’s claim against the county for alleged medical malpractice accrued on August 2, 2019.  The six month period for her to present a timely claim for damages expired on February 2, 2020.  She did not present a claim by that deadline.  On March 21, 2020, the Governor of California issued Executive Order N-35-20, dealing with the COVID-19 Pandemic.  Paragraph 11 of N-35-20 provides,  “The time for presenting a claim pursuant to Government Code section 911, et seq., is hereby extended by 60 days.”  By Executive Order N-71-20, issued June 20, 2020, the Governor extended these times by an additional 60 days.  Thus, the total extension is 120 days. According to Executive Order N-08-21, the 120-day extension applies to claims that accrued before June 30, 2021.  On September 15, 2021–more than a year after her claim accrued—the petitioner presented an application to the county for leave to present a late claim.  The county denied the application.  The petitioner then petitioned the trial court for relief from the claim requirements.  The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to present a late-claim application to the county within a year of her cause of action’s accrual.  The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that Executive Order N-35-20 had extended the deadline to present applications for leave to present late claims.

 

The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of N-35-20.  Statutory rules of construction apply to executive orders.  The plain language of the order applies the order to the deadline to present claims—not the deadline to apply for leave to present a late claim.  Further, the executive order must be interpreted in the context of the overall statutory scheme.  The Government Claims Act statutory scheme clearly differentiates between “claims” and “applications.”  The two are not synonymous.  Had the Governor intended to extend the one-year deadline for presenting late-claim applications, he would have said so in the order.  Code of Civil Procedure section 1858 bars courts from redrafting statutes, or executive orders, to add in omitted language.  Further, the Governor’s inclusion of an extension of time only for claims implies the exclusion of other extensions of deadlines, such as applications.  Finally, interpreting the order to apply to claims but not to applications would not lead to absurd results.  A claimant who misses the claim deadline can apply for relief.  By contrast, the deadline for the late-claim application is jurisdictional, and missing it puts the claimant out of court.

 

The appellate court further ruled that the petitioner had waived her challenge to the trial court judge (on the ground that the judge had previously been with county counsel) because at the beginning of the hearing the judge announced that fact, and the attorney representing the petitioner did not object either at that time or before the judge adopted her tentative ruling as final.

Because Parole Agents Did Not Enter into Special Relationship with Victim Murdered by Her Parolee Grandson, Their Employing Agency Could Not Be Held Liable for Negligence

In Russell v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, published December 16, 2021, the Third Appellate District reversed a trial court’s denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury trial.  The plaintiff was the son of a woman who was raped and murdered by her grandson, a parolee who suffered from severe mental illness and substance abuse.  The victim had raised the grandson and treated him like a son.  One of the defendants was the grandson’s parole agent from 2007 to 2012, and the other was the parole agent from 2012 to the month of the victim’s murder in 2013.  From 2007 to 2011, the grandson lived with the victim while the grandson was on parole.  The first parole agent and the victim interacted at least twice a month and were friendly.  The agent authorized the grandson living at the victim’s house.  He regularly drug tested the grandson, assisted the victim by ordering the grandson to obtain mental health treatment when he appeared unstable, and agreed to help the grandson find his own place to live.  He advised the victim not to give the grandson all of his Social Security money at once, so that he would have enough money through the month.  In 2011, the grandson was arrested for sex crimes.  In 2012, the grandson was released from state hospital.  He went to stay with the grandmother at her house.   When the second parole agent took over the case, the grandson was homeless, and the grandmother wanted him to stay at her home.  The parole agent informed them that they could not live together, because the house was too close to a school and the grandson was a registered sex offender.  The agent eventually told her that the grandson could be at her home during the day, but had to leave at night.  There was disputed evidence the agent  promised the grandmother that he would find the grandson his own place to live.  The grandson repeatedly absconded and cut off his GPS tracking device.  At one point, the grandson was arrested at the victim’s house by a fugitive apprehension team.  The grandmother was allowing the grandson to live with her.  In late 2012 or early 2013, the grandmother called the agent and told her the grandson was “acting out,” and that the grandmother had had to pull a knife on him. In February 2013, the grandson was jailed and released.  Three days later, the grandson killed the grandmother.  The plaintiff sued the Department of Corrections and the parole agents for negligence.  At trial, the court instructed the jury to determine whether the agents were in a special relationship with the grandmother.  The jury found a special relationship existed, that the agents breached a duty of care to the grandmother, and that the breach caused the rape and murder.  The jury apportioned 60% fault against the Department.  The trial court denied the Department’s JNOV motion.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court had erred in submitting the issue of whether a special relationship existed to the jury.  A person does not owe another person a duty to warn or protect against a third party’s acts unless there exists a special relationship between the parties (or between the defendant and the third party) or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty.  Whether a duty exists is an issue of law for the court, not an issue of fact for the jury.  Although the Department did not object to the special relationship instruction to the jury, a party does not forfeit application of the proper standard of review by failing to object in the trial court.  Further, the Department stated in briefing that the duty issue was one of law.  The appellate court therefore examined the evidence de novo to determine whether a special relationship existed, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  The court determined that neither agent formed a special relationship with the grandmother that would have given rise to a duty to warn her of the grandson’s dangerous propensities.  Neither agent made an express or implied promise of protection to the grandmother that caused her to detrimentally rely on the promise.  Neither agent lulled the grandmother into a false sense of security, inducing detrimental reliance and causing her to worsen her position.  Neither created a foreseeable peril to the grandmother that was not readily discoverable by the grandmother.  The court therefore reversed the judgment. 

Challenge to One-Time Benefit Program Is Moot after Money Spent

In Cerletti v. Newsom, published November 17, 2021, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 5 dismissed an appeal from denial of a temporary restraining order against government spending in connection with a one-time benefit program as moot.  In April 2020, Governor Newsom established a $75 million Disaster Relief Fund to support undocumented Californians impacted by COVID-19.  The plaintiffs, as taxpayers, sued to challenge the project as an unlawful expenditure of funds.  In May 2020, they applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re a preliminary injunction, seeking to halt distribution of benefits under the project.  The court denied the application on grounds including that prejudgment injunctive relief is not ordinarily available to remedy an alleged harm based on taxpayer standing.  The plaintiffs petitioned the appellate court for writ relief.  The appellate court denied the petition on grounds including the availability of an appeal.  The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the TRO.  They petitioned for a writ of supersedeas staying the order denying the TRO and the project itself.  The appellate court denied the petition, citing the rule that taxpayer harm is ordinarily insufficient to establish irreparable harm warranting preliminary injunctive relief.  While the appeal was briefed, the project money was all spent.

The appellate court ruled that because the money was spent, the appeal was moot.  While the court could resolve the case anyway if it raised an important issue likely to recur, but that evades timely appellate review, the court ruled that this was not such a case.  This was an emergency project to provide one-time payments during an extraordinary pandemic, which caused a state of emergency and a temporary pause in the operation of the Legislature.  There was nothing suggesting it was likely to recur.  

Family of Decedent May Recover "Loss of Life" Damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Even Though Barred by California Law

In Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim, published August 3, 2021, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment based on jury verdict for the plaintiffs in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action.  The defendant officers tased and used multiple choke holds on a "suspicious person" at a laundromat who had a screwdriver in his bag and who did not immediately comply with a command to put his hands behind his back.  The decedent fell into a coma, and died eight days later.  The jury awarded the decedent's family a total of $13.2 million in damages.  The award included $3.6 million for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering; $3.6 million for the decedent's children's loss of decedent's companionship and society; and $3.6 million for decedent's "loss of life."  The defendants appealed the award of damages for decedent's loss of life, on the ground that California state law on wrongful death damages (Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34) barred damages for loss of life.  The district court rejected the defendants' argument.

The majority of the 9th Circuit panel agreed.  Because section 1983 is silent as to loss of life damages, the California law barring such damages controls, unless it is inconsistent with the policies of section 1983.  In Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014), the 9th Circuit concluded that California law's ban on damages for pre-death pain and suffering was inconsistent with he policies of section 1983.  Section 1983 was intended to provide a remedy for killings unconstitutionally caused or acquiesced in by state governments, the  Chaudhry court concluded; and in cases where the victim dies quickly, there often will be no damages remedy at all under section 377.34.  The Chaudhry court therefore concluded that section 377.34 does not apply to section 1983 claims where the decedent's death was caused by violation of federal law.  The majority saw no meaningful way to distinguish Chaudhry from this case.  

A dissenting judge concluded that the award of damages for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering was sufficient to satisfy section 1983's remedial purpose without also awarding damages for loss of life.  He further urged the court to revisit Chaudhry en banc.

Time to File Suit in State Court Is Tolled While Federal Action Is Pending, Through Mandate Issued in Appeal of Right

In Sales v. City of Tustin, published June 8, 2021, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 3 reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant city, granted based on the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff alleges her decedent fled an improper detention, was chased into traffic, and was killed.  On the last day to file a lawsuit under California law (six months after her claim was denied), the plaintiff filed a suit in federal court alleging federal and state causes of action.  The district court denied a defense summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity.  The defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the 9th Circuit.  That court reversed the denial of summary judgment.  On remand, the district court concluded that the appellate ruling resolved all of the federal claims in favor of the defendants, and entered judgment on those claims.  The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and dismissed them.  That occurred in 2016.  The plaintiff appealed the result to the 9th Circuit.  The 9th Circuit affirmed the decision.  The court then denied a rehearing en banc.  The court issued its mandate on December 5, 2018.  The plaintiff refiled her state law causes of action in state court on December 19, 2018.  The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on the ground that under 28 U.S.C. section 1367, the plaintiff's time to file her state court claim was tolled only until the district court dismissed the state law claims in 2016.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court interpreted section 1367 incorrectly.  Section 1367 governs supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in federal court.  Subdivision (d) provides that the period of limitations for any state claim joined with federal claims shall be tolled while the claim is pending in federal court, and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed.  The appellate court joined the majority of courts to extend the tolling deadline through the pendency of an appeal of right, through the mandate returning the appeal to the district court, and then for 30 days after the mandate.  That the appeal addressed only the dismissal of the federal claims, and not the state claims, did not matter; if the federal court had reversed judgment on the federal claims, the district court might have reasserted jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Statutory Treble Damages Provision for Cover-Up of Childhood Sexual Abuse Is Punitive Damages Award, Barred by Statutory Immunity

In Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior Court (Doe), published May 21, 2021, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 3 issued a writ directing a trial court to grant a motion to strike a treble damages prayer in a lawsuit.  The lawsuit alleged that the petitioner district covered up an employee's sexual abuse of a student, leading to the sexual abuse of the plaintiff student.  The suit alleged causes of action against the district for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; breach of mandatory duty to report suspected child abuse; negligent failure to train, warn, or educate; and negligent supervision of a minor.  The plaintiff sought an award of economic and noneconomic damages against all defendants, and an award of treble damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 against the district.  The district moved to strike the treble damages prayer under Government Code section 818, which immunizes public entities from punitive and exemplary damages.  Relying on the legislative history of the amendment of section 340.1 that added the treble damages provision, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the treble damages provision had a compensatory function.

The appellate court disagreed.  The Government Claims Act maintains souvereign immunity from punitive damages that are awarded to punish the defendant and to deter outrageous conduct in the future, while waiving immunity for normal tort damages awarded to compensate the plaintiff for injury suffered, restoring the plaintiff as nearly as possible to her former position.  Treble damages under section 340.1 are imposed to punish and deter cover-ups, not to compensate the plaintiff.  The legislative history-- including a statement attributed to the bill's author that the treble damages are needed "to compensate victims who never should have been victims" as well as an "effective deterrent" against cover ups--does not unambiguously demonstrate the Legislature in fact added the treble damages provision to the statute for that purpose.  While the fact that an entity covered up past abuse may add to a victim's emotional distress, that is an item of harm for which a jury can award compensatory damages.  By definition, the treble damages award is in addition to the plaintiff's actual damages.  The treble damages provision is plainly designed to punish those who cover up childhood sexual abuse and thereby to deter future cover-ups, rather than to compensate victims.  The provision is therefore primarily punitive under section 818.  Case law allowing mandatory civil penalties under section 818 is inapposite; those provisions lie outside the perimeters of a tort action and are fixed amounts.  The treble damages are awarded only in tort actions for injury, and are based on a jury's calculation of damages.  They are therefore punitive damages.

Social Workers Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Judicial Deception, but Employing County Not Liable for Minor Medical Examinations in Violation of Policy

In Benevidez v. County of San Diego, published April 12, 2021, the 9th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court's dismissal of an action against social workers and their county employer.  The complaint alleged that the defendant social workers obtained a protective custody warrant and removed the minors from their home.  A juvenile court held a detention hearing to remove the minors and issued an order allowing medical examination of the minors.  The parents were present at the detention hearing, but neither the defendant social workers nor any county employees discussed the medical examinations with the parents before or after the hearings.  There were no discussions of medical examinations at the hearings.  No county employee sought the parents' consent to the examinations, or advised them of their right to be present  at the examinations.  These alleged actions contravened a 2015 county policy requiring employees to obtain parental consent and advise parents of their right to be present.  The minors were then examined under the court orders.  The parents were not informed until after the examinations took place.  The parents appealed the juvenile court's removal decisions but not the medical examinations or related orders.  The parents then filed suit in federal court.  The federal court dismissed the second amended complaint.

The 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction.  The doctrine prevents federal lawsuits that challenge a state court's judicial actions, and thus act as de facto appeals from the state court action.  The doctrine does not apply where a plaintiff alleges that court orders were obtained through extrinsic fraud.  Here, the plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the examination orders were obtained without their knowledge, and that the requests falsely represented that reasonable efforts had been made to notify the parents about the medical examinations.  The parents' lack of appeal of the juvenile court decision on the medical examinations did not affect the doctrine, since an appeal would not have remedied the damage done by the examinations having taken place.  The district court erred by granting the social workers qualified immunity, because regardless of whether liability for performing the examination was settled or not, the law barring judicial deception in regard to child custody proceedings was sufficiently established to give the defendants fair notice that what they were allegedly doing violated the parents' Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association.  The district court properly dismissed the Monell allegations of county liability.  Because the social workers' conduct allegedly violated the county's policy, the policy itself could not have caused the injury.  And a single incident in a non-life-threatening situation was insufficient to support liability for failure to train.