Government Liability Update

Officers Did Not Discriminate against Deaf DUI Suspect by Not Providing Her with Sign Language Interpreter

In Mayfield v. City of Mesa, published March 24, 2025, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit under Title 11 of the American with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  While the plaintiff, who is deaf, was driving home at night, a police officer observed her weaving in traffic and pulled her over.  During the traffic stop, she requested an American Sign Language interpreter.  Based on the footage from officer body cams, the officer and another officer communicated with the plaintiff using a combination of notes typed on cellphones, notes on a notepad, lip reading, and gestures.  The plaintiff was given and able to complete sobriety tests, but did not pass those tests.  She was taken to a DUI facility for a blood test.  She requested an American Sign Language interpreter but was told that none was available.  The plaintiff was charged with driving under the influence, but these charges were dropped when the plaintiff pleaded guilty to reckless driving.  The plaintiff sued the city, alleging the officers discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability by providing either an in-person ASL interpreter or a video remote interpreting service after she was pulled over.  The district court granted a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, ruling that the plaintiff's claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that alternatively plaintiff failed to state a claim under the ADA or RA.

The 9th Circuit disagreed about Heck v. Humphrey.  Heck, which applies to ADA/RA claims, a plaintiff's civil claims challenging government conduct in connection with arrest and prosecution may not proceed if a judgment in her favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction or sentence.  Here, a judgment in plaintiff's favor on whether the officers accommodated her in testing for a DUI would not invalidate her conviction for reckless driving, which was based on the plaintiff weaving in traffic before the traffic stop.  But the 9th Circuit agreed that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for failure to accommodate.  A claim under Title II of the ADA may arise where police fail to reasonably accommodate a plaintiff's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the plaintiff to suffer greater injury or indignity in the process than other arrestees.  There is no per se obligation to provide an on-site interpreter for a deaf person every time one is requested.  The test is whether the person has received an auxiliary aid sufficient to prevent any real hindrance in her ability to exchange information.  In the context of arrests, the court must also consider whether any exigent circumstances would render a proposed accommodation impracticable.  Here, the body cam footage establishes that the plaintiff's understanding of the initial officer's instructions was sufficient to enable her to provide the information requested and complete the field sobriety tests, and thus communicate with each other in all material aspects.  Likewise, in the DUI processing facility, the plaintiff was able to effectively communicate in all material aspects.  Traffic stops, particularly for suspected DUIs, present exigent circumstances that limit the range of what would constitute a reasonable modification of police procedures.  The safety concerns of a roadside traffic stop, the need to promptly determine a motorist's ability to drive, and the need to collect accurate test results before evidence dissipates all warrant acting without unnecessary delay.  Because the bodycam footage would preclude the plaintiff from amending her complaint to overcome such evidence, the court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.

Officers Did Not Discriminate against Deaf DUI Suspect by Not Providing Her with Sign Language Interpreter

In Mayfield v. City of Mesa, published March 24, 2025, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit under Title 11 of the American with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  While the plaintiff, who is deaf, was driving home at night, a police officer observed her weaving in traffic and pulled her over.  During the traffic stop, she requested an American Sign Language interpreter.  Based on the footage from officer body cams, the officer and another officer communicated with the plaintiff using a combination of notes typed on cellphones, notes on a notepad, lip reading, and gestures.  The plaintiff was given and able to complete sobriety tests, but did not pass those tests.  She was taken to a DUI facility for a blood test.  She requested an American Sign Language interpreter but was told that none was available.  The plaintiff was charged with driving under the influence, but these charges were dropped when the plaintiff pleaded guilty to reckless driving.  The plaintiff sued the city, alleging the officers discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability by providing either an in-person ASL interpreter or a video remote interpreting service after she was pulled over.  The district court granted a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, ruling that the plaintiff's claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that alternatively plaintiff failed to state a claim under the ADA or RA.

The 9th Circuit disagreed about Heck v. Humphrey.  Heck, which applies to ADA/RA claims, a plaintiff's civil claims challenging government conduct in connection with arrest and prosecution may not proceed if a judgment in her favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction or sentence.  Here, a judgment in plaintiff's favor on whether the officers accommodated her in testing for a DUI would not invalidate her conviction for reckless driving, which was based on the plaintiff weaving in traffic before the traffic stop.  But the 9th Circuit agreed that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for failure to accommodate.  A claim under Title II of the ADA may arise where police fail to reasonably accommodate a plaintiff's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the plaintiff to suffer greater injury or indignity in the process than other arrestees.  There is no per se obligation to provide an on-site interpreter for a deaf person every time one is requested.  The test is whether the person has received an auxiliary aid sufficient to prevent any real hindrance in her ability to exchange information.  In the context of arrests, the court must also consider whether any exigent circumstances would render a proposed accommodation impracticable.  Here, the body cam footage establishes that the plaintiff's understanding of the initial officer's instructions was sufficient to enable her to provide the information requested and complete the field sobriety tests, and thus communicate with each other in all material aspects.  Likewise, in the DUI processing facility, the plaintiff was able to effectively communicate in all material aspects.  Traffic stops, particularly for suspected DUIs, present exigent circumstances that limit the range of what would constitute a reasonable modification of police procedures.  The safety concerns of a roadside traffic stop, the need to promptly determine a motorist's ability to drive, and the need to collect accurate test results before evidence dissipates all warrant acting without unnecessary delay.  Because the bodycam footage would preclude the plaintiff from amending her complaint to overcome such evidence, the court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.

No Failure-to-Train Liability for Improper Extraction of Prisoner, Where Guards Were Trained in Extraction; Damages Excessive for Injury

In Bell v. Williams, published July 18, 2024, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment after jury verdict for a prisoner in a suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the Americans with Disability Act/Rehabilitation Act.  The prisoner plaintiff was an amputee, his right leg amputated above the knee.  The defendant sergeant at the jail where the plaintiff was imprisoned ordered the plaintiff extracted from his cell.  She further ordered that the plaintiff not be issued a wheelchair or other mobility device.  Instead, she required him to hop on one leg, which was against jail policy and the medical instructions for the plaintiff.  She then had guards carry him.  The plaintiff testified to pain of 9.5 out of 10 during the hopping, including pain in his shoulder from supporting himself on guards.  He felt something "pop" in his shoulder, and felt pain afterward.  Before trial, the district court found the guards except the sergeant were entitled to qualified immunity, but ruled that there were triable issues of fact as to the sergeant's qualified immunity.  A jury found that the sergeant used excessive force, and violated the plaintiff's rights under the 14th Amendment and the ADA/RA.  It further found that the jailing entity was liable under a Monell theory of failure to train.  It awarded damages of $504,000.

The 9th Circuit ruled that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict that the sergeant violated the 14th amendment.  The requirement that the plaintiff hop on one foot without a wheelchair or other device was not justified, particularly because evidence showed the plaintiff was compliant with the extraction (despite a history of prior noncompliant behavior) and the lack of exigent circumstances.  Because the jury did not award damages against her,  the court declined to consider whether she was entitled to qualified immunity.  Substantial evidence also supported liability under the ADA/RA for the entity.  By preventing the plaintiff from using a wheelchair or mobility device, in violation of policy, the jailor was depriving the plaintiff of reasonable accommodation, even in light of the jail's legitimate security interests.  But the 9th Circuit reversed the finding of Monell liability for failure to train. Establishing municipal liability based on a Monell theory of liability is difficult.  The evidence showed that the entity provided training of its guards through multiple programs.  Although the plaintiff contends the training is inadequate, that is insufficient to show deliberate indifference to a known danger.  Regarding the damages award, the court upheld the decision that the prisoner suffered a physical injury that was more than de minimis, which allowed him to recover mental and emotional injuries under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.  But the $504,000 was grossly excessive for the injury he suffered.

Plaintiff Need Not Exhaust Remedies under the IDEA to Obtain Money Damages under the ADA

In Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, published March 21, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a lower court decision dismissing a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The plaintiff, a deaf student, alleged that his school district deprived him of a Free and Appropriate Public Education by providing him with inadequate sign language interpreters, with the result that he was unable to graduate from high school with his class.  He and his family filed a complaint with the state department of education, alleging that the school had failed its duties under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and other laws.  Before an administrative hearing was held, the district and family entered into a settlement under which the district agreed to provide him the forward-looking equitable relief he sought.  The plaintiff then sued the district under the ADA, seeking compensatory damages.  The district court and circuit court held that the suit was barred under 20 U.S.C. section 1415(l), part of IDEA.  This statute provide that nothing in IDEA shall be construed to restrict individuals from seeking "remedies" under the ADA or other federal laws protecting rights of children with disabilities, except that before filing an action under one of those laws, seeking "relief" that is also available under the IDEA, the procedures under section 1415 for administrative remedies shall be exhausted.  The courts have split on whether this provision requires exhaustion of administrative remedies under IDEA when seeking damages (which are not available under IDEA).

The Supreme Court held that under the statutory language, "relief" and "remedies" have the same meaning.  Therefore, IDEA's administrative remedies must be exhausted only when seeking remedies (such as forward-looking equitable relief) that is available under IDEA.  Because backward-looking compensatory damages are not available under IDEA, plaintiffs do not need to exhaust IDEA's administrative remedies before suing under other federal statutes for such damages.

The Unruh Act Does Not Apply to School Districts or Other Public Entities

In Brennon B. v. Superior Court (West Contra Costa Unified School Dist.), published August 4, 2022, the California Supreme Court affirmed a demurrer sustained to a cause of action against a school district for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  The plaintiff, a disabled student, alleged that the school district violated the Unruh Act by failing to protect him against sexual assault.  The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the district was not a "business establishment" within the meaning of the act.  The plaintiff petitioned the lower court of appeal for writ relief.  The appellate court agreed with the trial court.

The California Supreme Court agreed as well. The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) bars discrimination "in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." The court examined the language of the Unruh Act, its legislative history, and the history of cases interpreting it, and concluded that the phrase "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever" is limited to entities acting as private business establishments.  In particular, earlier versions of the bill that became the Unruh Act stated that it applied to schools, but reflect a progressive narrowing of the legislation's applicability to "schools' before completely eliminating the reference to schools, while leaving the language concerning "business establishments" untouched.  The district was therefore not a "business establishment" when it provided educational services for the plaintiff.  The court also rejected an alternative argument that subdivision (f) of Civil Code section 51, which makes a violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 actionable under the Unruh Act, expanded the Unruh Act's application to school districts.  Analyzing the language and legislative history, the court concluded that subdivision (f) means that any violation of the ADA by a business establishment is also a violation of the Unruh Act.  The court further rejected an argument that the language of Education Code section 201, subdivision (g), as amended in 1998, stating a legislative intent that the chapter of the Education Code be interpreted as consistent with the Unruh Civil Rights Act, incorporated the Unruh Act's remedies into the Education Code.  Treating the amendment as bringing public school districts within the ambit of the Unruh Act would have exceeded the stated intention behind the 1998 amendment and been in tension with the Legislature's professed goal of mitigating litigation costs for schools.

Because State Law Did Not Clearly Establish Contractor Had Property Interest in Municipal Contract, City Attorney Entitled to Qualified Immunity to Due Process Claim for Recommending Ending Contract

In DePaul Industries v. Miller, published September 28, 2021, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed denial of qualified immunity to a defendant city attorney in a suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1982.  The plaintiff contracted with the city to provide unarmed security at city buildings.  The plaintiff was a qualified nonprofit agency for persons with disabilities, or QRF, under an Oregon law that requires cities to contract with QRFs in certain circumstances.  An employee of the plaintiff sued the city for alleged retaliation, and the plaintiff declined to defend and indemnify the city under an indemnification clause in the contracts.  When the contracst ended, the city elected to modify its security services by requiring that the security service employees be armed.  The plaintiff was the only QRF in the county providing unarmed security services.  The city decided not to renew the plaintiff's contracts, and awarded them to another security service.  The plaintiff sued the city and various city officials, including the city attorney, in their individual and official capacities.  One claim alleged the city attorney violated the plaintiff's substantive and procedural due process rights.  The city attorney moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.  The district court decided that the plaintiff had a clearly established property interest in its contracts with the city, and that a reasonable jury could conclude that the city used a pretext to cancel the contracts.

The 9th Circuit held that the district court erred, because the plaintiff's property interest in the contracts was not clearly established.  The Oregon QRF statute is not clear about whether it creates a protected property interest in annually renewable city contracts.  No Oregon court had considered the question.  Two cases cited by the district court were district court opinions that did not address QRFs at all.  The 9th Circuit noted its hesitancy to rely on district court decisions for the qualified immunity analysis.  Because the plaintiff did not have a clearly established property right to be protected by due process, the city attorney was entitled to qualified immunity.

Failure to Adopt Recommendations in Department of Education "Dear Colleague" Letters Is Not Actionable Failure to Accommodate

In Csutoras v. Paradise High School, published September 7, 2021, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant school and district in a lawsuit seeking money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  The plaintiff high school student requested and was granted accommodations under a section 504 plan concerning his schoolwork.  A male classmate assaulted the plaintiff at a football game while he was talking to a girl.  The assailant's motivation was jealousy over the girl.  It was not motivated in any way by the plaintiff's disability.  The school had no prior knowledge of harassment or bullying involving the plaintiff.  The plaintiff alleged that the school violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing to satisfy various Dear Colleague letters issued by the Department of Education.  The district court concluded that the Dear Colleague letters were not binding.

The 9th Circuit agreed.  While the letters set out a four-factor test for determining whether the Department may seek enforcement against a claimed violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act where a student is bullied based on a disability, the bullying is sufficiently serious to create a hostile environment, school officials knew or should have known of the bullying, and the school does not respond appropriately, the letters themselves limit the test to administrative enforcement actions and suits for injunctive relief.  Precedent creates a much higher bar for plaintiffs seeking damages under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act:  They must prove that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of the disability, or was deliberately indifferent to the disability.  The letters also disclaim any binding authority, and explicitly state that they do not apply to private suits for money damages.

Because School Districts Are Not Business Establishments, the Unruh Act Does Not Apply to Them

In Brennon B. v. Superior Court (West Contra Costa Unified School District), published November 13, 2020, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 1 denied a petition for a writ of mandate challenging an order sustaining the real party school district's demurrer to the petitioner's cause of action under the Unruh Act without leave to amend.  The petitioner, who suffers from autism, alleged he has been the victim of disability discrimination by the school, and that the school had violated the Unruh Act.  He contended that the school district was a "business establishment" under the Unruh Act.  He alternatively argued that even if a school district is not a business establishment, Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f) made any violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Act.

The appellate court rejected both arguments. The California Supreme Court has not addressed whether a government entity, and specifically a public school district, is a business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh Act.  The appellate court followed the analytical template the Supreme Court has employed in deciding whether a particular entity is a business establishment for purposes of the Act.  The court examined the historical background of the Act, and concluded nothing in that historical context (as a legislative reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's Civil Rights cases, dealing with federal legislation imposing antidiscrimination protections on private enterprises) supported application to public entities.  In examining the Unruh Act's legislative history, the court noted that successive versions of the legislation reduced the statute's discussion of "schools," first limiting it to business and vocational training schools and then eliminating any mention of schools.  By the time the Unruh Act was enacted, Brown v. Board of Education had already held racial discrimination in public schools unconstitutional.  Nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggests that it was intended to reach discriminatory conduct by state agents, such as public schools.  Supreme Court precedent grappling with the meaning of the term "business establishment" in the Unruh Act confirm that the elements the Court viewed as determining an entity was a business establishment--overall function enhancing economic value; providing athletic facilitiesas a principal activity and reason for existence; providing a physical plant for patrons to use at their convenience; conducting commercial transactions as an integral part of overall operations;  providing the functional equivalent of a classic place of public accommodation or amusement; or providing the sale of a good--apply to school districts.  Other lower court decisions have examined various legislative activities by public entities and concluded they were not the acts of a "business establishment" for purposes of the Unruh Act.  Those California court decisions that have discussed the Act as applying to public entities have not analyzed the issue.  Federal district court cases have split on whether the Unruh Act applies to California public school districts.  The ones that conclude that it does do not properly analyze the issue.  The court addressed whether Education Code section 200 et. seq.'s statement that the statute shall be interpreted as consistent with the Unruh Act did not expand the Act to covering school districts.

The appellate court also analyzed the argument that under statutory language, any violation of the ADA is a violation of the Unruh Act.  It concluded that this language actually indicates that any violation of the ADA by a business establishment is a violation of the Unruh Act.  The amendment of the Act to address ADA violations consistently discusses disability discrimination by business establishments.  An interpretation of the Act to apply to any violation of the ADA would also run afoul of the California Supreme Court's holding that employment discrimination is not covered by the Unruh Act.

Warrantless Seizure of Firearms in Household of Person Detained for 72-Hour Observation Did Not Violate Fourth Amendment; Second Amendment Argument Barred by Issue Preclusion

In Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, published July 23, 2019, the 9th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant city, its police department, and a police officer in a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.  Officers responded to the plaintiff's 911 call for a welfare check on her husband.  The husband was ranting, mentioned shooting up schools, and stated he had a gun safe full of guns.  The officers detained the husband under Welfare & Institutions Code section 5150 for 72 hours observation. After the husband was removed from the house, the plaintiff confirmed that there were firearms in the house.  The officers found 12 firearms in the house--one registered to the plaintiff alone, the rest unregistered or registered to the husband.  The plaintiff objected to the removal of her personal handgun.  The officers confiscated all of the firearms.  The husband was evaluated at the hospital, admitted, and released a week later.  Later, the city filed a petition for forfeiture of the firearms.  The plaintiff intervened, asserting personal ownership of her handgun and community ownership of the others.   She asserted her Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, since she was not prohibited from possessing or owning guns.  The court granted the city's petition.  The state court of appeal affirmed that the seizure did not violate the plaintiff's Second Amendment rights.  After the decision, the plaintiff changed the registration and ownership so that all the guns were in her name only, and obtained gun release clearances from the state department of justice.  The city declined her request to return the guns.  She then brought this lawsuit, joined by two gunowners' rights organizations.  She asserted violations of her Second Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights.

The 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the warrantless seizure of the firearms did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The public health and safety protection exception to the warrant requirement applied.  A seizure of a firearm in the possession or control of a person who has been detained because of an acute mental health episode responds to an immediate threat to community safety.  When asking whether the seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, three factors must be balanced, based on all the facts available to an objectively reasonable officer:  The public safety interest; the urgency of that interest; and the individual property, liberty, and privacy interests.  Here, the seizure of the guns from the home affected a serious private interest in the personal property kept in the home.  But because the officers had probable cause to detain involuntarily an individual experiencing an acute mental health episode and send him for evaluation; the individual had threatened to use the firearms; and the officers did not know whether the hospital would detain the individual or keep him detained long enough to permit the officers to seek a warrant, the urgency of a significant public safety interest was sufficient to outweigh the significant property interest.

The 9th Circuit also concluded that the Second Amendment claim was precluded by the final decision of the state court, in which the plaintiff's Second Amendment rights were litigated.  The addition of the advocacy groups as plaintiffs did not change the issue preclusion analysis, because they lacked institutional standing.  They failed to show that the issue of whether a single gun owner's firearms should be returned either impeded their ability to carry out their mission or required them to divert substantial resources away from the organizations' preferred uses.

Complaint Alleging Improper Solitary Confinement of Mentally Ill Inmates Stated Claim under Eighth Amendment

In Disability Rights Montana, Inc. v. Batista, published July 19, 2019, the 9th Circuit reversed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 lawsuit at the pleading stage.  An organization tasked by Congress with protecting the rights of mentally ill persons filed suit alleging Montana prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment through policies and practices of placing mentally ill prisoners in longterm solitary confinement and failing to properly diagnose and medicate them.  The district court granted a motion to dismiss the action.

The 9th Circuit ruled that the complaint adequately pleaded a claim under the Eighth Amendment.  Where a plaintiff alleges systemwide deficiencies that expose inmates in a prison's custody to a substantial risk of serious harm, courts assess the claim through a two-prong inquiry.  The first, objective prong requires that the plaintiff show that the prison's conditions pose a substantial risk of serious harm.  The second, subjective prong requires a showing that a prison official was deliberately indifferent by being aware of the facts from which an inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and also drawing the inference.  The complaint satisfied the first prong by alleging patterns of prisoners being denied diagnosis and medication, and policies placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary for weeks and months at a time without significant mental health care.  It also satisfied the prong by providing multiple examples of the defendants' policies causing prisoners' mental health to worsen, resulting in self-harm or suicide.  The complaint satisfied the second prong by alleging that the prison system had been sued twice  complaining about factually similar problems; that the prison sought certification from a national body whose mental health care standards would have put them on notice of the problems, that the prison received regular grievances from prisoners about the complaints, and that the organization had repeatedly informed prison officials of the deficiencies in treatment.