In Estate v. Soakai v. Abdelaziz, published May 16, 2025, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of the police officer defendants' motion to dismiss the action at the pleading stage based on qualified immunity. According to the complaint's allegations, the defendant officers spotted a person they believed had participated in an illegal car rally. Against department policy, the officers began pursuing the suspect, through busy city streets, at speeds exceeding 60 mph. The defendants did not turn on their lights or siren, or report the chase to the dispatcher. They were allegedly intent on making the suspect crash. The suspect's car crashed into an area near a taco truck. The plaintiff's decedent was struck and died of his injuries in front of his plaintiff mother, who suffered a broken back in the crash. Other plaintiffs in the group suffered severe injuries. The defendant officers allegedly did not stop, but drove past the scene of the accident, still with lights and siren off, and did not return until they heard other officers approaching the crash scene. When they returned, the officers pretended not to have been at the scene previously. The officers were allegedly overheard at the scene saying that they were satisfied that the suspect appeared injured, and hoped he died of his injuries. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal from denial of their motion to dismiss.
The panel majority affirmed. The plaintiffs' claim that the officers violated their constitutional rights by conducting the high-speed chase was a claim for violation of the substantive due process clause of the 14th Amendment. To state a claim, they had to allege facts showing that the high-speed chase was for the purpose of harming a fleeing suspect and was unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement purpose. The majority held that the facts alleged stated such a claim, and that the intent to injure did not have to be directed toward the injured bystanders for them to be able to state a claim. The majority further held that existing precedent clearly established that bystanders were foreseeable victims of high-speed chases intended only to injure the suspect, and so the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The alternative substantive due process claim was a state-created danger claim arising out of failing to summon or render emergency services after the crash. Even if the officers had not intended to harm a person, the facts alleged showed that they placed the plaintiffs in a worse position than they would have occupied if the defendants had not acted at all; they created or exposed the plaintiffs to a particularized danger; and the danger resulted in a foreseeable harm to the plaintiffs. Although the danger from the car chase itself was not particularized to the plaintiffs, the harm from the officers allegedly delaying medical treatment by driving past, doubling back only when other officers approached, and then pretending they were arriving for the first time was particularized to the plaintiffs. They also showed deliberate indifference by their actions. Although no controlling case applied the state-created danger to bystanders injured after a high-speed chase, existing precedent concerning state-created dangers and impeding medical care placed the constitutional violation beyond debate.
The dissenting judge opined that the majority had expanded the two theories of violation of substantive due process beyond existing precedent, and that the officers should therefore be entitled to qualified immunity.