In Wilson v. County of San Joaquin, published July 30, 2019, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant county. The plaintiffs' infant child, in critical condition, was transported from plaintiffs' house by private ambulance. Two City of Stockton firefighters rode in the ambulance and performed emergency medical procedures. The infant eventually passed away. The city firefighters provided their services under an agreement between the city and county under which the city's fire department would provide emergency medical services as part of the county's emergency medical services system. The plaintiffs sued the county for the firefighters' lifesaving efforts. They alleged that the firefighters committed medical malpractice and professional negligence. The trial court granted the county summary adjudication under Government Code section 850.6. Section 850.6 provides that when a public entity provides "fire protection or firefighting service" outside of the public entity's regular area, the public entity receiving the fire protection or firefighting service is not liable for any act or omission of the public entity providing the service.
The appellate court concluded that section 850.6's immunity did not apply. The Law Revision Commission comment on section 850.6 stated that the statute makes clear which public entity is liable "when one entity calls for the assistance of another in fighting a fire." The comment, along with the statute's plain language, indicates that it applies only to services related to fighting a fire. Cases interpret a related immunity, Government Code section 850.4 (providing immunity for injury caused in fighting fires) not to apply absolute immunity to lifesaving actions unrelated to fighting fires; instead, Health & Safety Code section 1799.107 provides only a qualified immunity to such activities, immunizing public entities and emergency rescue personnel from liability for providing emergency medical services unless performed in bad faith or in a grossly negligent matter. The court concluded the placement of both section 850.4 and 850.6 in the same chapter suggests a legislative intent that they be interpreted similarly.