Government Liability Update

Claim for Failure to Provide Adequate Warning Barred by Design Immunity Where Warnings Addressed by Plans

In Stufkosky v. California Department of Transportation, ordered published November 28, 2023, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6 affirmed summary judgment in the state's favor based on design immunity.  On a state highway, a vehicle struck a deer.  The impact sent the deer into the opposing lane, where it struck another vehicle.  That vehicle veered across the centerline and collided with the vehicle driven by the plaintiffs' decedent.  At the roadway portion where the accident occurred, a four-foot-wide painted median with rumble strips separates traffic.  Six deer warning signs appear along the 15-mile segment of the roadway where the accident occurred.  The closest one facing westbound traffic is approximately a mile from the accident site; the closest one facing westbound traffic two miles away, a position it was moved to after a request from the Department of Fish and Game.  The plaintiffs sued the state for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property, alleging the roadway's design, lack of deer crossing signs, and high speed limit.  The trial court found design immunity under Government Code section 830.6 was a complete defense to the plaintiffs' claims.

The appellate court agreed.  The state established the elements of design immunity.  The plaintiffs' allegations allege the required causal connection, by alleging that the state designed the roadway without certain safety features they contend would have made it safer.  The state satisfied the burden of establishing discretionary approval of the plan by submitting detailed plans for the area of the roadway where the accident occurred, and by a traffic engineer attesting to the applicable design standards and how the state addressed the dangers posed by deer entering traffic and vehicles crossing the median.  The entity need not submit evidence that it considered a particular design feature but decided not to include it.  Limiting design immunity to those features expressly considered would be tantamount to requiring public entities to address all conceivable design features during the approval process. They need not do so.  The state produced substantial evidence that the design was reasonable.  The plaintiffs did not dispute the plans  were properly approved and complied with prevailing design standards. Nor did they dispute the state placed deer warning signs east and west of the accident site. These facts alone are sufficient to show the approved design plans were reasonable. The state also submitted a traffic engineer's declaration that the accident rate for the area was below the statewide average for similar locations; that a state system for determining whether median barriers would improve safety did not identify the system, due to insufficient centerline collisions;  that no additional deer warning signs were warranted; that the speed limit accorded with the vehicle code; and that the state reasonably approved all relevant plans before construction and that the design was reasonable.  The plaintiff's expert's disagreement did not eliminate substantial evidence of reasonableness.  The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the trial court failed to address their separate and independent allegation that the state created a dangerous condition by failing to warn adequately of deer crossings, and that under Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639 design immunity did not bar this claim.  Tansavatdi declined to decide the issue presented here:  whether design immunity affects a failure to warn claim when a public entity produces evidence that it considered whether to provide a warning.  The state produced evidence that its design plans specified the quantity and placement of deer crossing signs.  The plaintiffs disputed only that the state warned motorists of this danger adequately.  The trial court resolved that issue in the state's favor.  Substantial evidence supports that finding.

Officers Were Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Using Deadly Force on Unarmed Domestic Violence Suspect Who Charged Them in Confined Space

In Waid v. County of Lyon, published November 21, 2023, a divided panel of the  9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of two police officers.  The defendant officers responded to a 911 call seeking help with a domestic violence incident.  When one of the officers knocked on the door of the caller’s home, the caller’s minor children came out and told the officer their parents were fighting and their mother needed an ambulance.  One child said there were no weapons in the house except a BB gun.  The officers entered, the lead officer announcing himself and the officer behind him drawing his weapon and pointing it forward as he entered.  As the officers entered the kitchen, the decedent, out of sight, swore at the officers.  The officers saw the decedent at the end of a hallway. Both pointed their weapons at the decedent and told him to get on the ground.  The decedent ignored the commands and ran down the short hallway toward the officers.  The officers shot him five times.  The plaintiffs sued the officers for use of excessive force under the 4th Amendmentand interfering with familial relationships in violation of the 14th Amendment.  The district court granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

The panel majority affirmed summary judgment on both claims.  The majority held that the facts, even with all disputes resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor, did not show an obvious violation of constitutional rights.  Fourth Amendment violations must be beyond debate to be considered obvious.  Obvious violations are thus found only in exceedingly rare circumstances with extreme facts.  Here, the officers did not obviously violate the decedent’s right to be free of excessive force.  It was not obvious that the use of force was objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstance confronting the officers.  The decedent used aggressive language, ignored an order from the officers, and rushed towards them in a small and confined space.  The officers were responding to an active domestic violence situation, and needed to make split-second decisions.  It is not obvious the officers were constitutionally precluded from firing.  Because there was not an obvious constitutional violation, the plaintiffs had to show controlling authorities or a persuasive consensus that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that the officers’ conduct violated the 4th Amendment.  They failed to do so.  A case holding that shooting a suspect after he had fallen to the ground from gunshots, and stomping his head, violated the 4th Amendment did not apply, because the five shots were continuous, the suspect began falling during the shots, he did not fall until after the shooting stopped, and the officers did not shoot him after he fell.  Other cases where suspects did not advance toward officers or present a danger to the officers or others did not apply where the suspect was advancing, and would have presented a threat to the 911 caller if the officers retreated.  The officers were entitled to summary judgment on the 14th Amendment claim because they did not have time to deliberate, and there was no evidence they acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate law-enforcement objective of protecting themselves.

A dissenting judge would have denied qualified immunity as to the use of force claim.  Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the decedent was clearly illuminated, unarmed, shirtless, with both hands visible; and there was nothing to be seen in his hands or waistband.  Further, the decedent was moving away form his wife’s presumed location, and was not actively engaging in a domestic dispute.  The officers were larger than the suspect, and had less-lethal weapons.  They did not warn that they would use deadly force.https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/11/21/22-15382.pdf

Public Park Was Not a Dangerous Condition of Public Property Due to Lack of Surveillance Cameras

In Summerfield v. City of Inglewood, published October 25, 2023, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 8 affirmed dismissal of a wrongful death suit after demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.  In January 2021, the plaintiffs' decedent drove to a park in the defendant city to play basketball.  While he was in his vehicle, he was shot and killed.  The plaintiffs asserted causes of action against the city, which owned and operated the park, for dangerous condition of public property and negligence.  The operative First Amended Complaint alleged that the park was supposed to be closed to the public due to COVID-19, but a city employee opened the park gym to the public in violation of the city's COVID protocol, which was a substantial factor in drawing the decedent and the perpetrator to the park.  The FAC alleged there were no security cameras in the parking lot, and a lack of attendants, control measures, and security.  The FAC alleged there had been "multiple shootings" at the park before the incident, but described only two incidents, in 1997 and 2012.  The FAC alleged that considering the multiple shootings, the lack of cameras presented attractive opportunities to criminals.  It asserted the city was liable under Government Code sections 815.6 (violation of mandatory duty).  The trial court ruled that the complaint, as amended, failed to identify a dangerous condition of public property.

The appellate court agreed.  Case law establishes that the presences or absence of security guards is not a physical characteristic of public property and thus not actionable as a dangerous condition of public property.  Further, public entities are immune under Government Code section 845 for alleged failure to provide security services or police presence.  The plaintiffs therefore cannot support their claim that failure to provide security at the parking lot was a dangerous condition.  The alleged failure to take adequate precautions from employees opening the gym to the public is also not a dangerous condition or defective in a way that foreseeably endangers those using the property.  Dangerous condition claims must be specifically pleaded, and must specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition.  The FAC failed to allege sufficient facts that the city's failure to provide adequate precautions was a dangerous condition of public property.  The allegation that the city failed to provide security cameras despite ongoing criminal activity failed because the FAC identified only two crimes over a 23-year span.  Further, third party criminal activity does not constitute a dangerous condition of public property unless the property itself is in a dangerous condition and that condition increases or intensifies the risk of injury to the public.  A parking lot is not dangerous because it lacks surveillance cameras; it needs surveillance cameras if it is dangerous.  The FAC failed to plead sufficient facts to show a causal connection:  that the absence of security cameras created a substantial risk of being shot.  The theory that the city failed to provide adequate warning about the dangerous condition failed because the FAC failed to allege a dangerous condition.  Further, a public entity has no duty to warn against criminal conduct.  Because a city cannot be held liable for nonstatutory negligence, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer against the negligence cause of action.  The plaintiffs failed to adequately show they could amend the complaint to state a claim.

One justice wrote a concurring opinion asserting that to establish a novel theory of tort liability, a plaintiff must establish the benefit would outweigh the burden.  The plaintiffs cannot establish that imposing a duty on public entities to place surveillance cameras and other security wherever crime has occurred would outweigh whatever benefit might result. 

Prison Officials Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity or PREP Act Immunity for Allegedly Inadequate Attempts to Prevent COVID Spread during Inmate Transfer

In Hampton v. State of California, published October 3, 2023, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 lawsuit brought by the wife of an inmate who died of COVID-19 in San Quentin prison.  The case arises out of the same circumstances as Polanco v. Diaz (9th Cir. 2023) 76 F.4th 918:  The state officials allegedly ordered prisoners in the California Institution for Men, which was suffering a severe COVID-19 outbreak early in the Pandemic, transferred to San Quentin, which was COVID-free.  The officials allegedly took insufficient measures to test the transferred inmates or to isolate them from the San Quentin population.  San Quentin went from being COVID free at the end of May 2020 to having 2,000 inmates (2/3 of the population) infected in August 2020.  By September 2020, 26 inmates and one correctional officer had died of the disease.  The decedent was a 62-year-old inmate who died in September 2020 of COVID.  His wife asserted an 8th Amendment claim under section 1983, state statutory claims, and a state law negligence claim.  The defendants asserted all of the claims were barred by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act ("PREP Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d, immunity; that the 8th Amendment claim was barred by qualified immunity; and that the state law claims were barred by various Government Claims Act discretionary-act immunities and immunities in the California Emergency Services Act.   

The 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the complaint was not subject to dismissal.  The PREP Act's immunity for decisions regarding taking countermeasures to a declared state of emergency, because the allegations of the complaint were based on failure to apply covered countermeasures.  Qualified immunity did not apply at the pleading stage, because the Polanco decision established that the alleged failure to adequately take precautions during the transfer was deliberate indifference, and because it was clearly established in 2020 that inmates had a right to be free from exposure to a serious disease.  As for the state law immunities, the court reconsidered earlier decisions holding that a circuit court had jurisdiction to consider such immunities via interlocutory appeal.  The California Supreme Court's decision in  Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection District (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 798 established that Government Code immunities were not jurisdictional, and were immunities from liability rather than immunities from suit.  T

Neither 1st Amendment Right Not to Respond to Police Questioning, Nor 1st Amendment Claim for Retaliatory Police Investigation Was Clearly Established for Purposes of Qualified Immunity

In Moore v. Garnand, published September 29, 2023, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an order denying summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.  The defendant police officers investigated the plaintiff on suspicion of arson.  They went to the plaintiff's office with a search warrant.  A plaintiff was present with his attorney.  When the officers questioned the plaintiff, his attorney advised him to remain silent.  One defendant explained he had a warrant to seize the plaintiff's cell phone.  The attorney said the plaintiff would not give up his phone.  The officer took a cell phone out of the plaintiff's hand and handcuffed him.  The plaintiff refused to answer any questions.  The plaintiff was taken to the police station, his DNA and fingerprints were taken, and he was released.  The officers obtained a search warrant for the plaintiff's house and executed it.  During the search, a defendant officer said to the other plaintiff, the first plaintiff's wife, “You know we wouldn’t be here if your husband had just talked to us.” The investigation was closed for lack of evidence.  The plaintiffs sued one of the defendant officers under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging 4th amendment violations related to the search warrants.  After learning about the suit, the defendant officers reopened the criminal investigation against the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs dismissed their previous suit and brought the current action, alleging that the defendants opened the criminal investigations, arrested the first plaintiff, and obtained the search warrant for the home in retaliation for the first plaintiff's exercise of a 1st Amendment right to remain silent, and that their lawsuit and requests for information from the police were also protected 1st Amendment activities.  The defendants moved for summary judgment.  The plaintiffs moved for an order deferring or denying the motion while they sought discovery.  The district court granted the motion and denied the summary judgment motion without prejudice.

 The court of appeals ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal, despite the district court not ruling on the merits of the summary judgment motion.  The court has jurisdiction to consider purely legal qualified immunity questions when, as here, the district court denies the qualified immunity motion (thereby forcing defendants to undergo burdensome discovery) even if the district court leaves the issue open for reconsideration.  The court addressed only the second prong of qualified immunity:  whether the officers' conduct violated a clearly established right.  The claim that the officers retaliated against them because the first plaintiff exercised his 1st Amendment right to remain silent fails because the plaintiffs identify no case that clearly established that a person has a 1st amendment right to remain silent when questioned by police.  The case law establishing that the 1st Amendment right against state action includes the right to refrain from speaking at all defines the right at too high a level of generality to clearly establish the right at issue.  Case law from other jurisdictions, although nonbinding, reinforces the conclusion that a 1st Amendment right to remain silent during police questioning was not clearly established at the time.  The defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to that claim.  Similarly, no case law clearly establishes that a retaliatory investigation, per se, violates the 1st Amendment.  Again, nonbinding authority from other jurisdictions supports that the issue was not clearly established.

School District Can Be Held Liable for Injury to Student When School Bus Does Not Arrive on Time and Student Gets Ride to School

In Brinsmead v. Elk Grove Unified School District, published September 18, 2023, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the defendant district's demurrer.  According to the complaint, the plaintiffs' daughter was enrolled in the district's school bus program.  One morning, the daughter was present at the bus stop at the scheduled arrival time, to take the bus to school.  The bus did not arrive.  Neither the daughter nor her parents received notice of a delay in the bus service.  Forty minutes after the scheduled arrival time, the daughter got a ride to school in a friend's car.  During the ride, the car was hit head-on by another driver.  The daughter sustained fatal injuries.  The parents sued the school district for wrongful death and a survivor's action.  The district demurred to the complaint on the ground that Education Code section 44808 rendered it immune because the district had not yet begun to undertake the daughter's transportation to school.  After allowing leave to amend, the court sustained the demurrer to the amended complaint without leave to amend.

The appellate court disagreed.  Under Education Code section 44808, a district is immune from liability for the conduct or safety of pupils when not on school property.  But section 44808 provides an exception to immunity and a duty of care where the district has undertaken to provide transportation for a pupil to and from the school premises.  If the district makes that undertaking, it is liable for the pupil's safety while the pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of a district employee.  When a district accepts a student’s enrollment in a district’s school bus program to provide stable and reliable transportation to school, that acceptance constitutes a “specific undertaking” by the district within the meaning of section 44808.  The court rejected an argument that the undertaking begins only when a bus arrives.  The undertaking occurs both when the school bus arrives and transports students and also when the district accepts the responsibility of providing that transportation.  The appellate court further interpreted section 44808's phrase "should have been under  . . . supervision" to cover the time during which the bus should have arrived and provided transportation to a student.  Whether a particular student was or should have been under a district employee's direct supervision is a question of fact.  The parents therefore adequately alleged the daughter should have been under district supervision by the time she decided to find other transportation and was fatally injured.

The Hazardous Recreational Immunity Applied to Plaintiff Who Dove Off Groin into Water

In Carr v. City of Newport Beach, published August 29, 2023, a divided panel of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 3 affirmed summary judgment for the defendant city.  The plaintiff walked onto a 20-foot groin jutting out from a beach, and dove off of it.  His head struck bottom and he was rendered a quadriplegic.  He sued the city for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property.  The trial court granted summary judgment based on Government Code section 831.7's Hazardous Recreational Activity immunity.

The panel majority affirmed the decision.  Among the activities that section 831.7 defines as a hazardous recreational activity is "[a]ny form of diving into water from other than a diving board or diving platform, or at any place or from any structure where diving is prohibited and reasonable warning thereof has been given."  The majority interpreted these provisions as operating in the disjunctive.  Therefore, any dive into water from other than a diving board or diving platform is a hazardous recreational activity, regardless of whether diving is prohibited and reasonable warning given.  The majority rejected the plaintiff's argument that triable issues existed regarding the gross negligence exception to the immunity.  The plaintiff contended that there was gross negligence because the city prohibited diving off groins yet did not post a warning of that prohibition, and because city lifeguards watched him dive and did not interfere.  The gross negligence exception does not apply to a failure to warn or protect against a risk inherent in the activity, such as the risk of striking an object when diving headfirst into water.  Further, the argument that the lifeguards did not enforce the law is barred by Government Code section 818.2's immunity for failing to enforce the law.

A dissenting justice opined that the majority's interpretation of section 831.7 would render the second part of the statute superfluous, and that the immunity applied only when diving from a structure where diving is prohibited and reasonable warning given.  The justice also opined that there were triable issues of fact on whether there was a dangerous condition.

Both the majority and the dissent asked the Legislature and the California Supreme Court to clarify section 831.7.

School District Did Not Violate Confidentiality of Medical Information Act by Requiring Employee to Provide Verification of COVID-19 Vaccination Status or Undergo Weekly Testing

In Rossi v. Sequoia Union Elementary School District, published August 25, 2023, the Fifth Appellate District affirmed dismissal after demurrer was sustained in this case and in two other related appeals arising out of similar circumstances.  During the State of Emergency declared due to COVID-19, the State Public Health Officer issued an order requiring K-12 schools to verify the COVID-19 vaccination status of all school workers.  The plaintiff was providing in-person classroom assistance when the order issued.  The plaintiff repeatedly refused to disclose her vaccination status or undergo weekly testing.  After attempts to accommodate her with at-home employment, the district eventually terminated her employment.  The plaintiff sued the school district under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code section 56 et seq.  She alleged causes of action for discrimination due to the plaintiff's refusal to authorize a release of her medical information (Civil Code section 56.20(b)) and for unauthorized use of her medical information, in violation of section 56.20(c).  The trial court sustained the district's demurrer without leave to amend.

The appellate court held that the section 56.20(b) claim was properly resolved by demurrer.    Section 56.20(b) provides that nothing in the section shall prohibit an employer from taking such action as is necessary in the absence of medical information due to an employee's refusal to sign an authorization permitting a health care provider to release information to others.  Where an employer demonstrates that it acted out of a legal necessity to comply with a lawful order, the exception's application can be determined as a matter of law, because it turns on interpretation of the order.  Here, there was no room for factual debate on how the district could have complied with the health order's requirements other than directing her to stay home, and terminating her when it was clear she was never going to test.  As for the section 56.20(c) cause of action, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer because the plaintiff failed to plead a prima facie case that her medical information was "disclosed."  It did not appear she could save her complaint by amendment, so the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

14th Amendment Claim for Failure to Protect Pretrial Detainee Mental Patient from Fellow Patient Requires Showing of More than Negligence

In Alexander v. Nguyen, published August 25, 2023, the 9th Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case.  The plaintiff was a pretrial detainee who was being treated at a state mental hospital until he was competent to stand trial on a criminal charge.  While he was there, a fellow patient struck his head with a fist.  The staff considered multiple factors, and determined that the plaintiff should not be moved out of the unit.  Instead, they took other measures in an attempt to prevent a further attack.  Less than two weeks later, the patient attacked the plaintiff again.  The staff then decided to transfer the plaintiff to another unit.  There was no further violence toward the plaintiff while he was at the hospital.  The plaintiff sued the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, alleging a violation of his 14th Amendment right to substantive due process.  The psychiatrist moved for summary judgment, arguing that he had not violated the plaintiff's rights, and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.  He supported the motion with an expert affidavit that the psychiatrist had acted within the standard of care.  The plaintiff did not offer any evidence disputing the affidavit.  The district court granted the psychiatrist summary judgment on the second prong of qualified immunity:  That it was not clearly established that his actions violated the Constitution.

The 9th Circuit affirmed on a different ground, the first prong of qualified immunity:  That the plaintiff could not establish denial of appropriate medical care in violation of the 14th Amendment.  Pretrial detainees' 14th Amendment claims for violation of the right to adequate medical care are determined under an objective deliberate indifference standard.  Under that standard, mere lack of due care is not enough to show a constitutional violation.  The plaintiff must prove someting more than negligence but less than subjective itnent--something akin to reckless disregard.  Similarly, a patient involuntarily committed to a state hospital alleging a violation of the constitutional right to safe conditions, decisions made by appropriate professionals are presumptively valid, and liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.  Liability requires a finding of conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.  Here, there is no evidence that the psychiatrist failed to act reasonably in response to the first attack on the plaintiff.  The benefit of hindsight from the fact that the plaintiff was attacked a second time does not show the psychiatrist's original decision was unreasonable.  There was therefore no violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Motorcyclist Who Hits Cable Fence While Offroading Barred from Recovery by Hazardous Recreational Activity Immunity

In Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Commission, published August 21, 2023, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2 affirmed summary judgment for the defendant commission.  The commission, a public entity, owns a 160-acre piece of unoccupied desert land, consisting of several parcels between residential areas.  Public paved streets run north-south of the property.  There are two east-west unpaved trails on the property.  The commission decided to fence off the perimeter of the property, using a fence consisting of 5/16" metal cable suspended 3.5 feet in the air and supported by posts every 15 feet.  Gates were installed.  The plaintiff was riding on one of the roads along the side of the property when he turned onto one of the off-road paths on the property.  After traveling about a quarter mile at 20-25 mph, the plaintiff approached the cable fence.  He did not see it until he was 10-15 feet away.  He braked but could not stop before hitting the cable.  He sustained serious injuries.  The commission moved for summary judgment, on the grounds that the fence was not a dangerous condition, and that even if it was, the commission was entitled to design immunity and hazardous recreational immunity.  The trial court granted the motion on the ground of design immunity.

The appellate court affirmed summary judgment on the ground that Government Code section 831.7's hazardous recreational activity immunity applied.  The statute provides that a public entity is not liable to any person who participates in a hazardous recreational activity for any damage or injury to property or persons arising out of that hazardous recreational activity.   The statute defines "hazardous recreational activities" in several ways.  Subdivision (b) initially defines it to mean " a recreational activity conducted on property of a public entity that creates a substantial, as distinguished from a minor, trivial, or insignificant, risk of injury to a participant or a spectator."  But subdivisions (b)(1)-(3) also define as hazardous recreational activities a non-exclusive list of activities, including "off-road motorcycling . . . of any kind."  The plaintiff contended there was a triable issue of fact on whether he was engaged in a recreational activity, because he was traveling across the commission's property to avoid traffic rather than for recreation.  But subdivision (b)(3), which includes off-road motorcycling, focuses on the activity, not the purpose.  The plaintiff was off-road motorcycling, and so was engaged in a hazardous recreational activity.  The plaintiff argued that subdivision (c)(1)(A)'s "failure to warn" exception applied.  Under this exception, the immunity does not apply where the injury is caused by "[f]ailure of the public entity or employee to guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or of another hazardous recreational activity known to the public entity or employee that is not reasonably assumed by the participant as inherently a part of the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose."  Here, common experience suggests that the plaintiff reasonably assumed the risk of colliding with natural and unnatural objects when he rode off-road through unpaved, unoccupied desert property, including fences of varying materials and sizes that demarcate property lines.  The commission had no duty to warn of the inherent risk of running into a cable fence.

Gov. Code, § 831.7