In Julian v. Mission Community Hospital, published May 2, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 7 affirmed summary judgment in favor of Los Angeles Unified School District, the Los Angeles Unified School Police, five police officers, and a private hospital in a lawsuit brought by a school teacher. The teacher complained to the principal that another teacher "physically assaulted" her by grabbing her hand as she tried to clsoe a door. Another teacher texted the principal that the teacher "wants to slit her wrists" concerning some recent changes at the school. The teacher had scratches on her arms that the teacher had told the principal were caused by her cats. Officers of the school police approached the teacher to interview her about the alleged assault. The teacher responded by running down a hallway, dropping to the floor, and crying and screaming. The officers called paramedics, who strapped the teacher to a gurney as she resisted. She was taken to the hospital, where an officer gave the hospital a Welfare and Institutions Code 5150 detention application. The hospital determined that the teacher should be detained. She was examined and released the next day. She sued the defendants for violations of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5000 et seq), violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the California Constitution, and false imprisonment. The trial court granted the school defendants summary judgment, and sustained the hospital's demurrer.
The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's theory that the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act created any cause of action for damages that would apply. Portions of the Act create limited causes of action for damages, none of which applied here. The other portions did not satisfy any of the tests for whether a statute creates a cause of action for damages. That portions of the Act do specifically provide causes of action indicates that the Legislature did not intend the other portions to create additional causes of action.
As to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim, neither the school district nor its police department could be sued under section 1983 because the school district is an arm of the state, and the district's police department was a division of the district. Therefore, neither was a "person" under section 1983. Further, the plaintiff failed to show that either had any unconstitutional custom, policy or practice that led to her detention. The plaintiff alleged that the police officer defendants violated her rights under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Ninth Amendment. No facts showed any violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The plaintiff failed to persuade the court that a "right to be properly cared for by physicians" existed under the Ninth Amendment; and in any event such a right would not apply to the police defendants. The Fourth Amendment claim failed because the undisputed facts established that the officers had probable cause because the officers, as lay persons, could articulate behavioral symptoms of mental disorder that the plaintiff displayed: thought processes, as evidenced by words or actions or emotional affect, that are bizarre or inappropriate. The issues of fact the plaintiff sought to raise--such as her contention that her cats made the scratches on her arms--did not undermine the facts that established probable cause. Her allegations of civil conspiracy between the school police failed because a conspiracy requires an underlying constitutional violation, and she failed to show any.
The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's claims that the California Constitution's provisions regarding free speech, right to petition the government, due process, or equal protection created a cause of action for damages when the action is not tied to an established common law or statutory action. The plaintiff did not allege any such action. Whether there is a cause of action for violation of the right to privacy under the California constitution is unsettled; but the plaintiff failed to state the elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Similarly, the law is unsettled on whether the California Constitution's right against unreasonable searches and seizures creates a cause of action for damages; but if it did, the defendants would be immune from liability. Welfare and Institutions Code section 5278 immunizes persons authorized to detain individuals under the Act if they acted with probable cause and did not commit negligent acts, intentional torts, or criminal wrongs during the course of the detention. The police defendants had probable cause to detain the plaintiff, and there was no showing of other wrongs committed. The plaintiff failed to show facts that would establish a violation of the Bane Act.
Finally, the appellate court ruled that the hospital defendants were not state actors for purposes of section 1983, and did not violate the California Constitution.