Government Liability Update

Public Entity Immunity to Punitive Damages Applies Broadly, and Bars Enhanced Damages under Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1

In Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior Court (Jane Doe), published June 1, 2023, the California Supreme Court affirmed a lower appellate court case reversing denial of a motion to strike a damages claim.  An alleged victim of sexual abuse by an employee of the school at which she was a student sued the defendant school district alleging negligence and failure to report suspected child abuse.  She sought an award of up to treble damages from the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1(b)(1), as amended in 2019.  The district moved to strike from the complaint allegations of a cover-up and the request for treble damages, under Government Code section 818, which bars punitive and exemplary damages from being awarded against public entities.  The trial court denied the motion, and concluded that section 340.1(b)(1)'s treble damages provision was intended to be compensatory, not punitive.  The court of appeal granted the district's writ petition reversing the trial court's decision.  The appellate court determined that the treble damages were primarily punitive and thus barred by section 818.  The California Supreme Court granted review of the ruling.  While review was pending, other court of appeal agreed that enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are not recoverable against public entities.

The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the appellate court's conclusion.  Government Code section 818 provides, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”  While the statute clearly shields public entities from punitive damages, also referred to as exemplary damages, its language establishes that its prohibition can extend to more than just what are conventionally referred to as punitive damages.  It applies to other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.  It therefore also applies to other kinds of damages when they function, in essence, as awards of punitive or exemplary damages.  This comports with the purpose of the statute, which codifies the common law rule exempting public entities from punitive damages because such damages impoverish the public treasury without serving any admonitory function.  Based on past case law, considerations relevant to determining whether a particular award is barred under section 818 may include whether the damages involved go beyond those necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff; whether a damages remedy functions to offset some otherwise applicable restriction on compensatory
damages; whether there is an element of discretion by the fact finder in the award of damages; and whether in the normal course actual damages are likely to be difficult to establish or quantify.  The ultimate question remains whether the damages function in essence as a form of punitive or exemplary damages.  The court noted previous decisions it had made reading section 818 narrowly, as only applying to damages that are "simply and solely" punitive:  People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30; San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 46; and Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139.  The court overruled those decisions insofar as they articulated the "simply and solely" or "simply or solely" punitive standard.  The court then concluded that the enhanced damages that section 340.1(b)(1) authorizes amount to punitive damages for purposes of section 818.  Section 340.1(b)(1) provides that, in an action seeking damages suffered due to childhood sexual assault, “a person who is
sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result of a cover up may recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless prohibited by another law.”  The court interpreted "unless otherwise prohibited by another law" as referring to Government Code section 818.  Section 340.1(b)(1) authorizes treble damages only upon proof of morally offensive behavior on behalf of the defendant.  The decision to increase the award lies entirely with the fact finder.  If the fact finder decides to increase the damages award, the amount by which it does so, although capped at treble damages, is not fixed.  The awards require the existence of actual injury, but may go substantially beyond the amounts necessary to fully compensate plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered.  The court did not find any nonpunitive characteristic or function that sufficiently distinguishes the enhanced damages from punitive damages.  The court further noted that the language of section 340.1(b)(1).

Plaintiff Need Not Exhaust Remedies under the IDEA to Obtain Money Damages under the ADA

In Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, published March 21, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a lower court decision dismissing a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The plaintiff, a deaf student, alleged that his school district deprived him of a Free and Appropriate Public Education by providing him with inadequate sign language interpreters, with the result that he was unable to graduate from high school with his class.  He and his family filed a complaint with the state department of education, alleging that the school had failed its duties under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and other laws.  Before an administrative hearing was held, the district and family entered into a settlement under which the district agreed to provide him the forward-looking equitable relief he sought.  The plaintiff then sued the district under the ADA, seeking compensatory damages.  The district court and circuit court held that the suit was barred under 20 U.S.C. section 1415(l), part of IDEA.  This statute provide that nothing in IDEA shall be construed to restrict individuals from seeking "remedies" under the ADA or other federal laws protecting rights of children with disabilities, except that before filing an action under one of those laws, seeking "relief" that is also available under the IDEA, the procedures under section 1415 for administrative remedies shall be exhausted.  The courts have split on whether this provision requires exhaustion of administrative remedies under IDEA when seeking damages (which are not available under IDEA).

The Supreme Court held that under the statutory language, "relief" and "remedies" have the same meaning.  Therefore, IDEA's administrative remedies must be exhausted only when seeking remedies (such as forward-looking equitable relief) that is available under IDEA.  Because backward-looking compensatory damages are not available under IDEA, plaintiffs do not need to exhaust IDEA's administrative remedies before suing under other federal statutes for such damages.

School District Did Not Violate Students' Free Speech Rights under First Amendment or California Law by Disciplining Them for Off-Campus Social Media Posts Targeting Fellow Students

In Chen v. Albany Unified School District, published December 27, 2022, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant school district and associated defendants.  A high school student created a private Instagram account to share memes, images, and comments with his close friends.  He allowed 13 people to follow his account.  He used the account to make cruelly insulting posts about various students in his school, including racist posts, including posts joking about lynching and slavery.  Another student made racist comments in the group, and “liked” offensive posts.  When one of the account’s followers showed posts in the group to students who had been depicted in a post with nooses, knowledge of the group’s contents spread throughout the school, causing great emotional upset and disruption.  Two of the account’s followers were physically assaulted.  The district voted to expel the group creator and the follower who posted racist comments.  Those students filed suits against the school district defendants under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging violation of free speech rights under the First Amendment and California law, as well as violation of procedural due process.  The district court related those cases.  It granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that the district defendants could properly regulate the students’ off-campus speech.

The court of appeals agreed.  The First Amendment’s protection of public school children’s speech is more limited than that of adult speech.  The speech of students in a school setting may be restricted if either it might reasonably lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities; or it collides with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.  Even outside the school setting, the First Amendment rights of minors are not co-extensive with adults’.  That is especially true in connection with school activities.  Students do not have a First Amendment right to target specific classmates with vulgar or abusive language.  Without limiting any political viewpoint or other protected content, schools may insist on civil discourse in the school context.  Here, the First Amendment would not prevent a school from punishing the sort of speech at issue if it had occurred under the school’s supervision.  The content threatens the targeted students’ sense of physical, emotional, and psychological security.  The threat of disruption of school activities is equally obvious (and demonstrated here).  The central question is whether the off-campus nature of the speech places it outside of the school’s authority to regulate or discipline.  Although schools may regulate some off-campus student speech, their authority is diminished as opposed to on-campus speech.  The 9th Circuit has devised a three-factor test for determining whether off-campus speech bears a sufficient nexus to the school to allow school district regulation:  (1) the degree and likelihood of harm to the school caused or augured by the speech; (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable the speech would reach and impact the school; and (3) the relation between the content and context of the speech and the school.  Under these standards, the group’s creator’s speech bore a sufficient nexus to the school to warrant disciplinary action by the school.  The student’s subjective intention to keep the account private is not controlling; the court must consider whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach and impact the school.  Given the ease with which electronic communications may be copied or shown to others, it was foreseeable that the posts would ultimately reach the targeted students.  Once the privacy of the account was breached, the degree and likelihood of harm to the school from the speech was significant.  Because the speech caused serious or severe bullying or harassment targeting specific individuals, the school’s regulatory interests remained significant, and strongly implicated the school’s authority and responsibility to act in loco parentis in protecting students from maltreatment by classmates.  A failure to respond to the harassment might have exposed it to potential liability for failure to respond adequately to a racially hostile environment.  Because the student never contended that he was espousing a particular political ideology,  his claim that the school was somehow censoring the promotion of a disfavored ideological message rings hollow.  Although the other student’s involvement in the account was substantially more limited, his contribution properly subjected him to school discipline as well.  The court rejected the students’ arguments that the school violated their rights under the California Constitution and Education Code sections 48950 and 48907.  California’s free speech rights for students under those provisions do no extend further than their First Amendment rights.  The creator student’s claim of violation of procedural due process fails, because the student pursued an administrative writ under California law on that point and lost.  Claim preclusive bars him from relitigating that issue in the federal lawsuit.  His argument that a member of the administrative body was biased against him is governed by the same procedural due process standards under federal law as under state law.

Social Workers Were Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Acting with Malice, Oppression, or in Reckless Disregard of Parent's Rights

In Casey N. v. County of Orange, published December 23, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 3, affirmed a jury verdict against the defendant county and two social workers in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit brought by a parent.  Social workers investigated allegations that the plaintiff's minor daughter was sexually abused by her father, who was divorced from the mother.  One social worker stated in her report her opinion that the mother was emotionally abusing the daughter, and was feeding information or coaching information to the child as part of a family law dispute.  The second social worker, who replaced the first, filed a report stating she was unsure whether sexual abuse had taken place, but also recommended the petition allege emotional abuse by the mother.  The deputy county counsel dismissed the sexual abuse allegations before the dependency court, and replaced them with allegations of emotional damage or endangerment based on allegations the mother had influenced the child to make false sexual abuse claims.  The dependency court found the mother had knowingly caused the minor to make false allegations against the father.  The court granted the agency's request that the minor be removed from the mother and given to the father.  The mother signed a stipulation giving sole legal and physical custody of the minor to the father with visitation by the mother.  She later asserted she had been bullied into signing the stipulation under threat of having her parental rights terminated.  The mother sued the social workers and the county for violating her right to familial association by deceiving the juvenile court into removing the minor from her custody.  The jury found the social workers liable, found the county liable under a Monell theory, and awarded punitive damages against the social workers.

The appellate court ruled that the issue of the materiality of the social workers' statements--whether, but for the dishonest or misleading statements, the challenged action would not have occurred.  In a section 1983 case based on judicial deception, the court decides materiality in a summary judgment proceeding, but the jury determines it at trial.  The court further ruled that substantial evidence supported the verdict against the social workers.  There was medical and other evidence of sexual abuse that the mother's dependency court counsel did not present, because the sexual assault accusation was dismissed and the evidence would have been irrelevant.  The mother also testified she was prevented from offering the evidence at the disposition hearing because she was coerced into signing the stipulation.  The court ruled that the social workers were not entitled to qualified immunity.  The jury's finding that the social workers had acted with malice, oppression, or in reckless disregard of the mother's rights established that their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.  Further, federal case law holds that the doctrine of qualified immunity merges with the merits in a case alleging judicial deception in the procurement of a search warrant.  The court declined to rule whether this holding applied here.  Substantial evidence also supported the Monell liability finding against the county, based on an official policy or custom of using false or misleading evidence, or in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, in reports, documents, and testimony to the juvenile court, as well as a failure to properly train social workers.

State Manual Provision Requiring Social Worker to Make Necessary Collateral Contacts with Persons Who Have Knowledge of Child's Condition Does Not Create Mandatory Duty

In Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, ordered published on November 16, 2022, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 8 affirmed an order dismissing a lawsuit after demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.  The plaintiff's four-year-old son fell at his school's playground, fracturing his arm.  The child had a developmental delay and was nonverbal.  The parents took the child to a doctor two days after the fall.  The doctor did not diagnose the fracture as abuse.  The principal at the son's school called the police and reported physical abuse of the son by an unknown party.  The defendant county's Department of Children and Family Services investigated the son's injury.  A department social worker reported that when she asked the son who injured him, the son pointed to his father.  The social worker concluded the child was at risk of harm, and took him into protective custody.  A juvenile court found prima facie evidence the son was subject to detention under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300.  After a forensic child abuse expert reported the injury could have been an accident, the juvenile court dismissed the department's petition and released the son to his parents.  The mother sued the county for negligence per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiff did not allege violation of a mandatory duty.

The appellate court concluded the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer.  Under Government Code section 815.6, a public entity may be held liable for violating a mandatory duty where an enactment creates an obligatory duty.  Liability may not be based on an enactment that creates a discretionary or permissive duty, or that requires the entity or employee to perform a function that involves the exercise of discretion.  The plaintiff alleged that a provision of the Child Welfare Services Manual of Policies and Procedure requiring social workers to make “necessary collateral contacts” with people “having knowledge of the condition” of children subject to allegations created a mandatory duty for the social worker to speak to the child's doctor.  Assuming (without deciding) that the provision is a regulation with legal force, the provision is discretionary.  The county must exercise discretion to determine what constitutes a "necessary" collateral contact.  Many people may have knowledge of a child's condition.  Deciding whom to deem a necessary contact requires balancing child safety, family preservation, and limited time and resources.  The provision does not create a mandatory duty to contact particular individuals.

Constructive Notice That Employee Is Sexually Abusing Students Is Sufficient for Negligence and CANRA Causes of Action against School District, but Not for Title IX and Education Code Section 220 Claims

In Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District, ordered published November 4, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2 reversed dismissal of a case after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.  An elementary school custodian allegedly molested multiple six-year-old students.  The plaintiffs sued the school district, alleging negligence in supervising the students and the custodian; negligent hiring and retention; negligence per se; violation of Title IX; failure to perform mandatory duties under CANRA, the mandated reporter act; and sex discrimination in education in violation of Education Code section 220.  The trial court sustained the district’s demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that the district had actual knowledge of prior acts of abuse by the custodian, or that it had actual knowledge that the custodian was abusing the plaintiffs.

The appellate court held that the complaint adequately pled causes of action against the district.  The district may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising, and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.  The negligence standard is “knew or should have known.”  Therefore, actual knowledge that an employee is prone to harming students, or is actually harming students, is not necessary.  Constructive notice is sufficient.  Case law applying an actual knowledge requirement when imposing negligence liability for a third party’s sexual abuse of children deal with non-school settings.  The complaint adequately alleged facts that would show constructive knowledge.  The CANRA cause of action also does not require actual knowledge, because it imposes a duty on mandated reporters to make a report when the reporter “knows or reasonably suspects” a child has been the victim of child abuse.  Reasonable suspicion does not require certainty. A breach of CANRA can support a negligence per se cause of action.  It would be objectively reasonable for persons in the position of the school’s employees who saw the conduct alleged in the complaint to reasonably suspect that the custodian was sexually abusing the plaintiffs.  The trial court properly dismissed the causes of action under Title IX and Education Code section 220, however; those provisions impose liability for a teacher sexually harassing a student only when an official at the district with authority to impose corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of the misconduct and is deliberately indifferent to it.

Public Hospital Immune from Liability for Employee's Alleged Sexual Abuse of Minor Mental Patient

In State Department of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (Jane Doe), published November 2, 2022, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 5 issued a writ directing a trial court to sustain the petitioner department's demurrer without leave to amend.  The real party plaintiff alleged that between 1997 and 1999, when she was a minor and a ward of the state confined at a state hospital, she was sexually assaulted by a department counselor.  She sued the department for negligence, negligent supervision/training/hiring/retention, sexual battery, assault, and statutory civil rights violations.  The department demurred to the complaint, based on Government Code section 854.8, subdivision (a)(2)'s immunity for injuries to mental patients.  The trial court concluded that section 854.8's exception for liability under Government Code section 855 (failure to provide adequate or sufficient equipment, personnel, or facilities required by statute or regulation) applied.  The trial court reasoned that Government Code section 815.2, which imposes vicarious liability on public employers for their employees' acts and omissions, provides minimum personnel standards.  It overruled the demurrer as to all causes of action except negligent supervision/training/hiring/retention, and granted the plaintiff leave to amend that cause of action to bring it within the scope of the exception to section 854.8.

The court of appeal disagreed with the trial court's reasoning.  Section 854.8 provides public entities broad immunity from liability for injuries suffered by an inpatient of a mental institution.  The immunity prevails over all liability provisions of the Government Claims Act, with the exception of the sections expressly described in the statute as exceptions.  The plaintiff relied on the exception for section 855.  Section 855, subdivision (a) imposes liability only when a statute or regulation sets forth a specific standard that gives the public medical facility clear notice as to the minimum requirements with which it must comply.  The trial court erred in ruling Government Code section 815.2 imposes minimum personnel standards triggering liability under section 855.  Section 815.2 does not require any public entity to provide adequate or sufficient equipment, personnel or facilities.  Further, section 815.2 is not one of the statutes listed in section 854.8 as an exception to the statute's immunity.  Section 815.2 is merely a general liability provision of the Act.  It is trumped by the specific immunity provision of section 845.8.  The plaintiff contended she could amend her complaint to allege the department violated other statutes and regulations, including the mandated reporting statute and regulation.  But neither the statute nor the regulation prescribes minimum standards for equipment, personnel, or facilities; and the plaintiff did not indicate she could allege those provisions were violated or proximately caused her injury.  None of the other regulations plaintiff contended were violated provide the requisite specific minimum standards.  The appellate court overruled its previous decision in Baber v. Napa State Hospital (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 213 that similar regulations supported liability under section 855.  The court instead followed Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 289, which requires that statutes or regulations impose specific minimum standards to support section 855 liability.

Alleged Participation in Obtaining Restraining Order without Informing Court of Custody Order, and Participation in Removing Child without Reasonable Cause and Detaining Child beyond Reasonable Period, Violates Clearly Established Law

in David v. Kaulukukui, published June 27, 2022, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a police officer's motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 lawsuit.  According to the complaint, a custody order awarded the plaintiff full custody of her daughter, denied the father visitation rights, and ordered that the father stay away and have no contact with the plaintiff.  The plaintiff and daughter lived on the Island of Hawaii, while the father lived on Kauai.  The plaintiff and child visited family on Kauai.  During the visit, the father had contact with the plaintiff and daughter over the plaintiff's protests.  The plaintiff then took the daughter to the father's workplace and demanded he apologize to the daughter.  When the plaintiff yelled at, pushed, and taunted the father, the police arrested her.  She posted bail, and she and the daughter returned to the island of Hawaii.  According to the plaintiff's complaint, after the altercation the defendant officer met with the father at the Kauai county police department.  The officer prepared and filed a petition for a protective order in family court on the father's behalf seeking to prohibit the mother from contacting any of the father's family members, including the daughter.  The petition did not mention the custody order.  The family court granted the petition and issued a TRO prohibiting the mother from having any contact with her daughter.  Two weeks later, a child welfare services official visited the mother's home and rated the mother a low to moderate risk score.  During the visit, the mother informed the CWS worker of the custody order.  A few days later, CWS officials conducted a "grab and go," taking the daughter from her school without a court order or prior notice to the mother, and put her in the father's custody on Kauai.  When the plaintiff attempted to report to the Kauai county police department that the daughter had been "kidnapped and was in the custody of an allegedly abusive, non-custodial parent, the defendant officer allegedly worked with other defendants to prevent the allegations from being investigated or a police report from being filed.  Eleven days later, the family court held a hearing on the TRO, learned of the custody order, and dismissed the prohibition against the plaintiff having contact with her daughter.  The daughter was returned home 21 days after being grabbed from her school.  The district court denied the defendant officer's motion for dismissal based on qualified immunity, on the ground that the operative complaint stated a plausible claim for violation of a clearly established right to familial association.

The court of appeals agreed.  A right to familial association under the 14th Amendment (for parents) and the 4th Amendment (for children) is clearly established.  9th Circuit case law at the time of the incident clearly established that as part of that right, parents and children have a right to be free from judicial deception in child custody proceedings and removal orders.  Judicial deception may occur through either affirmative misrepresentation or deliberate omission.  The facts alleged state a plausible claim that the defendant officer prepared a petition that intentionally omitted any reference to the custody order, and did not otherwise inform the court of the order; and that had the judge been informed, the court would not have granted the order.  It therefore stated a plausible claim for violation of the mother's and child's right familial association based on judicial deception.  Any reasonable official would understand that deliberately concealing material custody information from a court for the purpose of depriving a custodial parent of a child violates the law.  The allegations that the defendant officer's participation in removing the daughter and placing her in the father's custody also stated a plausible claim that the defendant violated clearly established law that removal of a child from a parent without the parent's consent or a court order, absent reasonable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger, violates the right to familial association.  The facts alleged also state a plausible claim that the continued separation exceeded that reasonably necessary to avert the specific injury at issue.

Public Entity's Attorneys Did Not Violate Minors' Constitutional Privacy Rights by Reviewing the Plaintiffs' Juvenile Case Files without Obtaining a Court Order

In A.C. v. Cortez, published May 13, 2022, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit against a county and its attorneys.  In an earlier lawsuit, the minor plaintiffs sued the county and county social workers for allegedly violating their 4th Amendment rights by interviewing them in the course of a child-abuse investigation, without a court order or parental consent.  Attorneys defending the county in that action reviewed the county's child-abuse investigation file without first obtaining a court order.  The plaintiffs then brought this action, alleging that the attorneys who accessed the file violated their constitutional right to privacy.  They relied on Gonzalez v. Spencer (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 832.  The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.  In an unpublished decision, the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the individual defendants based on qualified immunity.  The decision did not address the plaintiff' Monell claim against the county.  On rehearing, the 9th Circuit addressed the Monell issue.

The 9th Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez case did not identify a per se constitutional right in juvenile records that is always violated by third-party access.  Instead, the court applied the balancing test for determining when the federal constitutional right to informational privacy is properly infringed based on a showing of proper governmental interest.  Under this test, the court presumed that the files contained some highly sensitive information.  The potential for harm seemed low, since the information had not been used in any proceeding.  There were safeguards against misuse, because the plaintiffs allege only the county's attorneys reviewed the county's files; the attorneys have a duty to keep their clients' files confidential.  The most crucial factor is the need for access.  The need is high, because the county's attorneys have a duty to represent their client, and they concluded that adequate representation required reviewing the files.  The plaintiffs' prior lawsuit pertaining to how the county's employees conducted themselves with the plaintiffs gave rise to the attorneys' need to access the files.  The situation is analogous to litigation waiver in other areas of the law.  The need for access is sufficiently high that it outweighs the lesser possibility of harm.  The district court therefore properly dismissed the Monell claim.

School Personnel Do Not Owe Students Duty to Review Alarm Data and Video Recordings to Constantly Monitor Everyone on Campus

In Doe v. Anderson Union High School Dist., published May 4, 2022, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the defendant school district, principal, and superintendent.  A teacher at a high school in the district had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff student, then 17.  The relationship included sexual activity in his classroom.  The school district had no facts, reports, or rumors that the teacher had engaged in any improper relationship.  There were video security cameras aimed at the doors of the classroom.  The video footage was saved for 14 days before automatic erasure.  Per district policy, footage was reviewed only if the district learned of an incident that may have been caught on video.  The district maintained an alarm system that covered the main building and the classroom.  Each employee had a code to deactivate the alarm.  The district had not requested data from the alarm company on when alarms were deactivated or by whom.  The student sued the defendants for negligent hiring and negligent supervision.  The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence they knew or should have known that the teacher posed a risk of harm to students.  The plaintiff conceded lack of evidence of negligent hiring, and so focused on negligent supervision.  In opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted an expert declaration from a retired principal and school administrator.  He opined that the principal had a duty to monitor teachers to determine if they were spending too much time on campus late at night, including interviewing teachers and reviewing video footage.  The trial court ruled that the risk to the plaintiff was not foreseeable.

The appellate court ruled that the district's administrators' duty of supervision to protect students was limited to the risks of harm that were reasonably foreseeable--those known to the administrators or that reasonably should have been known to them.  School districts are not the insurers of their students' physical safety.  Sexual misconduct by school personnel is not inherently foreseeable.  The administrators did not know that the teacher would have se with the student, and had no information that would support a conclusion that they should have known.  They therefore did not have a duty to review alarm data and video recordings to constantly monitor all teachers, students, and campus visitors.  Nor did they have such a duty specifically as to the plaintiff and the teacher.  To impose such a duty on this record would be unreasonable.