Government Liability Update

Jail Medical Personnel Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Allegedly Providing Inadequate Care to Inmate Displaying Serious Cardiac Symptoms

In Russell v. Lumitap, published April 13, 2022, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part an order denying summary judgment to medical providers at a county jail.  The decedent prisoner came to prison medical providers complaining of vomiting, chest pain, and anxiety.  The first nurse who saw him gave him Pepto-Bismol and referred him for a mental health screening.  The second nurse, who saw him at the mental health intake center, gave him a dose of nitroglycerin.  The decedent’s pain increased.  The nurse called the on-call doctor, who ordered the decedent be given Motrin and be screened for mental illness.  The doctor never examined the decedent in person.  The decedent received a mental health screening and was returned to jail.  The inmate then returned to the jail medical clinic complaining of more severe pain.  She knew that per policy, if nitroglycerin did not relieve the patient’s symptoms, the patient should be hospitalized.  She called the nurse at the mental health intake center, who told her of the doctor’s orders.  The nurse administered Motrin and the decedent remained for observation.  The patient consulted with another nurse, who instructed him on relaxation and gave him a heat balm.  Eventually, the nurse observed the decedent in extreme distress.  She called paramedics.  The decedent was transferred to a hospital where he died.  He had suffered an aortic dissection.  The decedent’s parents sued the various medical personnel under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging deliberate indifference.  The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.  The district court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact.

The 9th Circuit affirmed as to all but one nurse.  At the time of the decedent’s death, a deliberate-indifference claim under the 14th Amendment were decided on the same standard as 8th Amendment claims, requiring a showing of deliberate indifference.  Later, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging a 14th Amendment violation need not show subjective deliberate indifference; only that the force used was objectively unreasonable.  The 9th Circuit then applied this rule to 14th Amendment claims, requiring that the plaintiff show that the defendant made an intentional decision putting the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm, and then did not take reasonableavailable measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious.  The court applies this objective standard to determine whether the defendants violated clearly-established law, even where the incident occurred before the change in the law.  The standard can be met where the care rendered is so inadequate to the circumstances known to the medical staff as to amount to deliberate indifference.  At the time of decedent’s death, the 9th Circuit had found deliberate indifference where nurses and a doctor had prescribed palliative treatment in response to serious symptoms, or providing life-saving measures to an inmate in obvious need.  Further, other circuits had applied the standard to obvious symptoms of heart attack, such as those the decedent displayed here.  Under this standard, a jury could find that all of the medical personnel—except for the nurse who called the doctor, and followed his orders (entitling her to qualified immunity)—violated clearly established law by having access to information that the decedent had a substantial risk of serious injury, and providing constitutionally inadequate treatment.

Officers Allegedly Violated Clearly-Established Law by Using Taser and Restraint Hold on Detainee Who Had Stopped Resisting

In Hyde v. City of Willcox, published January 6, 2022, the 9th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an action brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.  The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that decedent had mental health issues managed through medications.  He was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence.  While detained, he did not receive his prescribed medication.  After several hours, he became restless and charged around the booking area and female cell area, falling once and injuring himself.  The officers tased and struck the decedent multiple times, as they restrained him with handcuffs and leg irons and placed him in a restraint chair.  The decedent stopped breathing.  The officers were unable to revive him.  He died in the hospital the next day.  Causes of death included blunt force injuries, kidney damage caused by muscle breakdown, enlarged heart, and coronary artery atherosclerosis.  The decedent's parents sued the officers for use of excessive force, the municipal and supervisory defendants for failure to train, and all defendants for violating substantive due process and equal protection.  The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity and the plaintiffs had failed to plausibly plead a case for Monell liability.  The defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity, and asked the 9th Circuit to exercise pendant appellate jurisdiction over the Monell claim.

The 9th Circuit ruled that the complaint plausibly alleged that two of the officers violated the decedent's clearly-established constitutional rights.  Until the decedent was subdued and restrained, the officers' uses of tasers, blows, and restraints were reasonable.  Although the plaintiffs alleged that use of force against a mentally ill person was unreasonable, the complaint did not plausibly allege that the officers knew of the decedent's mental conditions or his prescriptions.  Instead, the complaint alleged that the decedent was calm and cooperative until he began running around and injuring himself.  But two officers' use of a taser and a restraint hold after the decedent was subdued and restrained was unreasonable.  Although the complaint was less than clear about the decedent's actions, and the parties did not include the jail video in the record, the court construed the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs.  Ninth Circuit case law clearly establishes use of intermediate force, such as a head restraint or taser, on a restrained and non-resisting suspect is unreasonable.  It also makes clear that officers must reassess use of force in an evolving situation as circumstances change.  The two officers allegedly had two minutes to realize the decedent, who was handcuffed, shackled, and exhausted, could no longer resist and did not pose a threat.  The court therefore affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to those officers.  But the panel reversed the ruling that the complaint plausibly alleged denial of medical care by denying him access to his medication and by not providing him medical care after the altercation.  The complaint did not plausibly allege that the named defendants played any role in denying the decedent his medication.  It also did not plausibly allege that the defendant officers knew the decedent was in medical distress after the melee.  Qualified immunity thus barred the claim.  The supervisor defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for the failure to train claim.  The plaintiffs did not allege any basis for the claim other than this single incident, which is inadequate to make out a claim for failure to train.  Because the municipalities' Monell liability was intertwined with the supervisors' liability (since the complaint relied on the same facts in alleging failure to train against the supervisors and municipalities), the court had jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the failure to dismiss the Monell claim, and reversed it.

Prison Officials Violated Clearly-Established Due Process Rights by Withholding Evidence from Inmate During Disciplinary Proceeding

In Melnik v. Dzurenda, published September 27, 2021, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed denial of a defense summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity.  The plaintiff inmate was charged with improper use of the prison mail system to smuggle drugs through the mail.  The defendant correctional officials had envelopes addressed to the plaintiff that contained drugs.  A disciplinary proceeding was brought against the plaintiff.  The officials denied the plaintiff's multiple requests to examine the envelopes or copies of the envelopes.  The plaintiff was found guilty.  He sued the officials for denial of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

The panel majority held that the district court properly denied the defendants' summary judgment motion.  On the first prong of qualified immunity, withholding documentary evidence from a disciplined inmate without an articulated explanation violated the inmate's established due process rights to present documentary evidence in his behalf.  Further, on the second prong, because multiple courts had held that the right to request documentary evidence included the right to inspect the evidence or copies of the evidence, the right was clearly established.

The dissenting judge agreed that the inmate's rights were violated, but opined that because there was no on-point Supreme Court or published 9th Circuit authority establishing that right, and other circuits disagreed about it, the right was not clearly established.

Pre-Trial Detainee's Constitutional Right to Have a Proper Medical Screen Conducted Clearly Established; Right to Direct-View Safety Checks Was Not

In Gordon v. County of Orange, published July 26, 2021, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment in favor of the defendant county and jail employees in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case.  The decedent f was arrested on heroin-related charges.  During his intake at the county jail, the decedent informed the defendant nurse at intake of his heroin habit.  Two detoxification protocols existed for assessing inmates suffering from substance withdrawal:  one for alcohol (CIWA) and one for opiates (COWS).  Jail staff used the CIWA protocol, rather than COWS.  A defense expert opined that CIWA was appropriate for a poly-drug abuser.  An expert for the plaintiff opined that if COWS had been used, the decedent would have been housed in the medical observation unit instead of general population, and would have been monitored more closely.  After his intake, the decedent was not assessed as he waited nearly ten hours to enter the general population.  When he entered general population, no CIWA or other evaluation of decedent occurred that day.  Although state regulations required hourly safety checks through direct visual observation, and the sheriff's department had a policy that the checks be conducted with a clear, direct view of the inmate, a defendant deputy conducted two of the safety checks from 12-15 feet away, too far away to ascertain whether decedent was breathing or alive.  A few hours after entering his cell, decedent was found unresponsive, his face blue and his skin cold.  He was pronounced dead.  The case was the subject of an earlier appeal, in which the 9th Circuit ruled that inadequate medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees required a showing of objective deliberate indifference.  After remand, the district court allowed additional expert discovery, and granted summary judgment for the individual defendants based on qualified immunity and for the county on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish Monell liability.

The 9th Circuit reversed the finding of qualified immunity for the nurse and observing deputy.  Regarding the nurse, the 9th Circuit ruled that in 2013, when the incident occurred, a body of authority clearly established that a pretrial detainee had a constitutional right to have a proper medical screen conducted to ensure the medically appropriate protocol was initiated. She was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of the immunity. The case against her was remanded for a factual analysis of whether, under the first prong of qualified immunity, she violated that clearly-established right.  As for the observing deputy, the 9th Circuit concluded that while pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to direct-view safety checks sufficient to determine whether their presentation indicates the need for medical treatment, that right was not clearly established in 2013.  The 9th Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the county, because a single incident is insufficient to establish a custom, policy, or practice sufficient to support Monell liability.

Court Must Analyze Facts and Circumstance to Determine Whether Officers Used Unconstitutional Amount of Force

In Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, published June 28, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a split per curiam opinion, reversed and remanded a summary judgment granted in favor of police officers.  The plaintiffs' decedent was arrested for trespassing and failure to appear in court for a traffic ticket.  While he was in jail, the decedent put a piece of clothing around his neck and tied it to the bars of his cell.  Multiple officers entered his cell. The decedent resisted. The officers handcuffed the decedent and put him in leg irons.  They moved him into a prone position, and an officer placed pressure on the decedent's back and torso.  After 15 minutes of struggling in this position, the decedent expired.  The decedents parents sued the police officers under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.  The district court granted summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.  The circuit court affirmed on the ground that the officers did not apply unconstitutionally excessive force.

The majority reversed the circuit court decision.  In assessing whether officers used excessive force, a court asks whether the offices' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.  Courts cannot apply the standards mechanically.  It requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.  Circumstances include the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff ’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.  The majority ruled that it was unclear whether the circuit court thought the use of a prone restraint is per se constitutional so long as an individual appears to resist officers' efforts to subdue him, no matter the kind, intensity, duration, or surrounding circumstances.  Factors such as the agency instructing its officers that pressing down on the back of a prone suspect can cause suffocation, and police guidance to get a subject off his stomach as soon as handcuffed to avoid suffocation and that struggles may be due to oxygen deficiency rather than desire to disobey officer commands, may be pertinent, along with the duration of the restrain and the fact the decedent was shackled.  The court expressed no view on whether the use of force was excessive or whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, but remanded the summary judgment to the circuit court.

Three justices dissented, opining the court should either deny review, or grant review and have the matter briefed and argued before deciding it.  

Prison Officer Did Not Violate Clearly-Established Law by Listening in on Portions of Prisoners' Phone Conversations with Civil Attorneys

In Witherow v. Baker, published May 18, 2021, a divided 9th Circuit panel affirmed summary judgment for a prison officer in a suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging violation of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights.  The prison unit the plaintiff was in did not allow prisoners to use wall phones.  The unit had a single portable phone, and each prisoner's use was limited to 20 minutes.  The phone did not have caller ID.  The officer would use a speaker and a flip switch to monitor the beginning of the call, to check whether the call was to an attorney or an attorney's office.  The officer would then stop listening.  Later in the call, the officer would check again, to see whether the prisoner had called someone else, and to make sure the prisoner was not depriving others of the phone by making unauthorized calls.  The district court granted the officer summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, on the grounds that she had not violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, and that if she had violated any such right, the right was not clearly established

The panel majority ruled that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the second prong:  the right was not clearly established.  The plaintiff failed to identify any binding authority, or a consensus of law, that a prison officer listening in on a prisoner's phone call with a civil attorney violated the prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights.  The majority further concluded that there was no need to address whether the officer's actions had violated the Fourth Amendment, because the situation was fact bound (involving technology from 2007-2008); it was unclear whether violation of the attorney-client privilege would involve the Fourth Amendment; and prisoners can challenge similar practices by bringing suits for declaratory and injunctive relief.

A judge wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  The judge opined that the panel should address whether the conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, to develop the law on that subject.

District Court May Bar Prisoner Plaintiff's Crucial Expert Evidence for Failure to Timely Comply with Expert Discovery

In Merchant v. Corizon Health, published April 2, 2021, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's exclusion of expert evidence and summary judgment in favor of prison officials.  The plaintiff, a prisoner, alleged that the state department of corrections and its medical provider were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and were negligent.  After obtaining a continuance of expert disclosure to accommodate his attorney's vacation, the plaintiff disclosed his only non-retained expert two days late; disclosed his expert report and non-retained experts five days late, and without the required information for the non-retained experts; disclosed more non-retained experts 61 days past the deadline; disclosed three rebuttal experts but produced the report for only one, and the report for another five days past the deadline; and disclosed a late affidavit from a non-retained expert.  The district court granted the provider's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiff's expert witnesses under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).  The district court excluded all expert witnesses except the single rebuttal expert whose report was disclosed timely.  The court then granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had insufficient expert evidence to establish either deliberate indifference or negligence.  It also ruled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act barred the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The 9th Circuit agreed that in light of the plaintiff's persistent disregard of Rule 26(a)(2)'s disclosure deadlines through the course of discovery, the district court acted within its discretion in excluding his improperly disclosed expert evidence.  The party facing that sanction bears the burden of showing that the discovery violation is either substantially justified or harmless, and whether a lesser sanction would be appropriate.  Where the violating party fails to move for a lesser sanction, district courts need not consider lesser sanctions.  The plaintiff did not do so.  The defendants also established that the plaintiff did not exhaust the administrative remedies he was required to exhaust.

Although Officers Had Probable Cause to Arrest Suspect, They Are Not Immune from Negligence Liability for Interfering with Paramedic Treatment; Immunity for Injuries to Prisoners Does Not Apply to Public Employees

In Collins v. County of San Diego, published February 17, 2021, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed a judgment entered after jury trial.  County sheriff's deputies investigated reports from the plaintiff that resulted from the plaintiff's delusions.  The plaintiff's roommates told the deputies that the plaintiff had been acting oddly.  There was conflicting evidence over whether the roommates said the plaintiff had been binge drinking.  The plaintiff left the apartment, stumbled, and fell.  A passerby called 911.  Paramedics arrived and began assessing the plaintiff.  An ambulance was called.  Sheriff's deputies, including one who had been involved in the call to the apartment, arrived and arrested the plaintiff.  There was conflicting evidence over whether the paramedics had completed assessment of the plaintiff.  The arresting deputy took the plaintiff to jail.  There, a nurse employed by the county conducted a medical intake exam.  The nurse decided the plaintiff was safe to place in a jail cell.  The plaintiff sustained a forehead injury, treated with a band-aid.  The jail doctor visited the plaintiff in jail.  He was not told of the plaintiff's hallucinations or incoherent statements, or that he had fallen and injured his head.  The doctor concluded no further care was needed.  The plaintiff fell again.  He was taken to a private hospital.  He was diagnosed with severely low sodium level and a brain bleed to his frontal lobe.  The doctors at the hospital allegedly mistreated the condition, further injuring the plaintiff.  The plaintiff settled with the hospital and its doctors.  He then sued the county, two of the arresting deputies, and the two nurses who saw him in jail.  The jury found the deputies and nurses negligent, but rejected an unlawful arrest claim on the ground the deputies had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.

The court of appeal rejected the defendants' various attacks on the judgment.  The defendants argued that the negligence verdict against the deputies was inconsistent with the finding that they had probable cause to arrest.  The appellate court concluded that while probable cause would immunize the deputies from liability for a negligent arrest, it did not immunize them from negligence apart from the arrest.  Here, there was evidence supporting the plaintiff's theory that the officers negligently interfered with the paramedics due to arresting him before they had a chance to finish their examination.  The court also rejected an attack on an instruction that the deputies were liable for the doctors' and hospital's alleged negligence in treating him.  A defendant who negligently injures a plaintiff is liable for any subsequent injury from negligent treatment of the injury they caused.  The court rejected the argument that Government Code section 845.6 immunized the deputies or county from liability for the subsequent medical treatment.  Section 845.6 applies only to injuries to prisoners, and the plaintiff was not yet a prisoner when the deputies allegedly interfered with the paramedics.  The appellate court rejected the argument that the individual defendants were immune from liability for the plaintiff's injuries in jail under Government Code section 844.6's immunity for injuries to prisoners.  Section 844.6 immunizes only public entities, not public employees.  The nurse who initially examined the plaintiff argued he was immune under Government Code section 855.6, which immunizes examinations to determine if persons are dangers to themselves or others.  The court ruled that the immunity did not apply, because it is inapplicable to examinations for the purpose of treatment.  One of the purposes of the examination was to determine whether the plaintiff needed medical treatment.  Finally, the court approved the trial court's apportionment of the offset from the doctors' and hospital's settlement against the judgment, which did not reduce the percentage of the settlement amount apportioned to noneconomic damages based on MICRA limitations on noneconomic damages.  MICRA caps apply only to judgments, not settlements.

Although Previous Authority Applied a Subjective Standard to Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claims by Pre-Conviction Prisoners, Qualified Immunity for Conduct During That Time Is Determined under an Objective Standard

In Sandoval v. County of Los Angeles, published January 13, 2021, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment granted to the defendant county and three jail nurses in a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.  The plaintiff’s decedent overdosed on methamphetamine before arrest, swallowing the drug in an effort to avoid discovery.  The decedent appeared ill when taken into custody.  He said he might be diabetic.  A nurse tested the decedent’s blood sugar level, which was normal.  A deputy told the first defendant nurse that the decedent was ill and needed to be checked more thoroughly.  The nurse gave the decedent a second, quick blood sugar test, which was normal, and then left.  The decedent was put in a cell that was sometimes used as a medical observation cell and sometimes as a normal holding cell.  Although the cell was 20 feet from the nursing station, the first defendant nurse did not check on the decedent for the remaining six hours of the nurse’s shift.  The failure may have stemmed from the cell’s mixed use.  After the decedent was left unmonitored for eight hours, a deputy noticed the decedent displaying seizure-like behavior.  The second defendant nurse, the lead nurse on the response team, was told several times to call paramedics, but refused to do so.   The third defendant nurse called the head nurse, who said to call paramedics.   She later admitted she should have called paramedics. Instead, EMTs were summoned.  EMTs, unlike paramedics, do not have the training to deal with an unresponsive patient and will not transport unresponsive patients.  The EMTs advised the nurses that they would not transport the decedent.  Paramedics were then summoned.  As they tried to transport him, the decedent died.  The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants.  It sustained several one-sentence objections the defendant made to evidence.

The panel majority held that the district court erred both in sustaining the objections and in granting summary judgment.  The majority held that the district court should not have sustained the one-sentence objections, which excluded much evidence important to the plaintiff, particularly relevance and hearsay objections.  The court held that relevance objections are seldom useful in summary judgment motions, because the determination of whether a fact is material decides whether it is relevant.  It also held hearsay objections are seldom proper, because the focus is on whether the information in the evidence would be admissible at trial, not the form in which it is presented.  Turning to the merits, the majority held that the district court erred in determining that because at the time of the incident the standard of liability for a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for medical care to a pre-conviction prisoner incorporated a subjective element, the nurses were entitled to qualified immunity unless they were subjectively aware that their actions violated clearly-established law.  Instead, the court held that the qualified immunity prong of whether the nurses violated the constitution would be decided under the current, objective standard; and that the clearly-established-law prong of qualified immunity would also be determined objectively, by deciding whether a reasonable employee, charged with knowledge of the then-existing law, would have believed that his or her conduct was unlawful.  Under that standard, summary judgment for the nurses was not appropriate.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the first defendant nurse acted objectively unreasonably in failing to examine the decedent more thoroughly, and in failing to monitor the decedent for hours.  The other two nurses acted objectively unreasonably in failing to summon paramedics, since an objective nurse in their situation would have known that EMTs could not transport an unresponsive patient.  All three nurses’ conduct violated the clearly established law that a patient in distress could not be denied immediate medical care.  The plaintiff had also submitted sufficient evidence that the county could be held liable for maintaining the policy of using the cell for either medical observation or ordinary holding, creating a situation where the nurses expected deputies to monitor the cell and deputies expected nurses to do so.

A judge concurred that the nurses who failed to summon paramedics were not entitled to qualified immunity, but opined that the first nurse was entitled to qualified immunity.  The judge asserted that because the legal standard at the time of the incident required subjective knowledge, there was insufficient evidence the nurse was subjectively aware of the decedent’s medical needs to overcome qualified immunity.  The judge further believed that the plaintiff had failed to raise a triable fact on the county’s liability.

Prison Guards Do Not Violate Clearly-Established Law by Making Excessive Noise While Conducting Court-Ordered Welfare Checks

In Rico v. Ducart, published November 20, 2020, a divided 9th Circuit panel held reversed denial of prison guards' motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 lawsuit brought by a plaintiff prisoner.  A federal court had ordered the California Department of Corrections to conduct welfare checks on inmates in Security Housing Units every half hour.  The electronic system for confirming the welfare check makes a loud noise for twelve seconds.  The unique physical structure of the SHU units at Pelican Bay prison creates more noise.  An inmate (released after he began his lawsuit) sued various administrative defendants and four guards for allegedly violating his EIghth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by causing excessive noise and depriving him of sleep.  He sued the guards for allegedly conducting the welfare checks in a haphazard way that made extra noise.  The district court granted the administrative defendants' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, but denied the motion as to the guards.  The guards filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity.

The panel majority ruled that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of the qualified immunity affirmative defense:  The guards did not violate a clearly-established constitutional right.  The court rejected the argument that the qualified immunity standard governing Fourth Amendment cases--requiring factually-specific prior case law establishing the constitutional violation--does not apply to Eighth Amendment cases.  The fact-specific, contextualized nature of the inquiry does not depend on the particular constitutional right alleged to have been violated.  Existing case law holding that failure to prevent excess noise by other inmates that causes sleep deprivation did not put prison guards on notice that causing noise while carrying out a court-ordered system of welfare checks violated an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights, or that the immutable characteristics of a solitary confinement unit was not conducive to those activities.  A court order does not give carte blanche to prison officials to commit obvious violations of rights.   But the order here did not fall into that category of obvious unlawfulness.  Further, that the guards implemented the welfare check system at a court's behest and under the supervision of a special  master plays a large role in determining what reasonable officials in the defendants' shoes would have understood about whether they were violating prisoners' rights.  To the extent the guards allegedly caused the excessive noise by conducting the welfare checks haphazardly, the alleged conduct fell under the category of reasonable mistakes that are covered by qualified immunity.

A dissenting judge opined that taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the guards' actions were not protected by qualified immunity.