In Adams v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, published January 9, 2024, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 3 reversed summary judgment for the defendant district. A peace officer employed by the department was driving to work wearing his uniform and carrying an off-duty firearm. At a gas station convenience store, the officer observed one of the plaintiffs, who looked "suspicious" to him. As the officer drove his vehicle past the pump where the plaintiff was sitting in a car with another plaintiff, the plaintiff shouted derogatory comments to the officer. The officer got into his vehicle and chased the vehicle. At one point, the officer turned on the dome light inside his vehicle and was pointing something at the plaintiffs that they believed to be a gun. The officer deviated from his commute to follow the car. The cars collided, and the plaintiffs' vehicle rolled down an embankment, hit a light pole and tree, and caught on fire. One of the plaintiffs eventually died, allegedly from his injuries. The officer was charged with reckless felony driving, exhibiting or drawing a firearm in the presence of a motor vehicle occupant, and misdemeanor reckless driving. The department moved for summary judgment on the ground that the officer was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time. The trial court observed there might be triable issues on scope of duty, but granted summary judgment.
The appellate court reversed. To the extend the trial court based the order granting the motion on the "going and coming" exception to respondeat superior, and the department's argument that the officer's authority as a peace officer, it erred. Inferences from the record support both the possibility he was engaged in law enforcement functions as an outgrowth of his employment, and that he was engaged in a personal road rage incident. That he was employed at the prison in culinary duty did not preclude that he was acting in the scope of his duties. He was a peace officer, and testified that he chased the plaintiffs because he did not want to let a "bad guy" get away. He was also unsure whether the plaintiffs knew him from "work." As a peace officer, Penal Code 836 gave him the power of a peace officer to arrest those he had probable cause to believe committed a public offense in his presence. There were also issues of fact on whether the plaintiffs believed the officer was acting under color of his authority as an officer. These triable issues of fact precluded summary judgment.